

Podkultura nasilja: Interpretativna analiza uboja*

Marvin E. Wolfgang

izredni profesor
Sociološki oddelek
Perinsilvanska univerza
Filadelfija

Franco Ferracuti

Inštitut za kriminalno antropologijo na univerzi
v Rimu
Raziskovalni center za socialne znanosti na
univerzi v Porto Ricu.

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(Pripomba uredništva)

PROBLEMI INTERPRETATIVNE ANALIZE

V današnji družbi je odvzem človeškega življenja s premišljenim ubojem ali ubojem iz afekta najbolj očitno odstopanje od norm sožitja.¹ Kot vse človekove ponašanje, moramo tudi takšno odstopanje presojati s stališča kulturnega okolja, v katerem se dogaja. De Champneuf², Guerry³ in Quetelet⁴ so že v prvih desetletjih 19. stol., Durkheim⁵ pa nekoliko pozneje, poudarjali nujnost raziskovanja »družbene fizike« oziroma tistih družbenih pojavov, ki jih označuje »zunanje dogajanje«, če že hoče znanstvenik razumeti ali razložiti hudodelstvo, samomor, prostitucijo in druga od norm odstopajoča dejanja. Ne vdajamo se sociološkemu fatalizmu, vendar bi analiza širokih makroskopskih medsebojnih odnosov lahko zmanjšala dinamične elemente omenjenih pojavov in povzročila ekološko prevaro, ki jo omenja Selvin⁶. Vendar zaradi bogatih individualnih razlik še ni nujno, da naj zgolj klinični pristop pripomore, da pridemo do Webrovega »Verstehen« ali do pomembnega ter primerrega razumevanja pravilnosti, istočnosti in osnov medsebojnega vpliva. In prav

* Predavanje na rednem letnjem sestanku Ameriškega sociološkega združenja v New Yorku, 29—31 avgusta 1960.

¹ Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*, New York, Rinehart & Company, 1958, str. 210; glej tudi str. 23—24.

² Zanimivo oceno o prispevku M. de Guerry de Champneufa glej v M. C. Elmer, »Century-Old Ecological Studies in France«, *American Journal of Sociology*, 39 (julij, 1933), str. 63—70.

³ A. M. Guerry, *Essai sur la statistique morale de la France*, Pariz, 1833.

⁴ A. Quetelet, *Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés; essai de physique sociale*, Pariz, Bachelier, 1835. Odličen povzetek in razlagi vpliva Queteleta, Guerryja in drugi iz prvih desetletij 19. stol. glej v Alfred Lindesmith in Yale Levin, »The Lombrosian Myth in Criminology«, *American Journal of Sociology*, 42, (marec 1937), str. 653—671.

⁵ Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951.

⁶ Hanan C. Selvin, »Durkheim's Suicide and Problems of Empirical Research«, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (maj 1958), str. 607—619.

to vrsto razumevanja isčemo, ko raziskujemo bodisi odstopanja bodisi skladnosti z normativnimi strukturami.⁷

Če imamo pred seboj deskriptivno ali eksperimentalno statistiko, potrjene hipoteze ali vsaj nekatere elemente domnev, ki se tičejo osnov za uboj, kot se kažejo v nedavnih raziskovanjih⁸, je nujno, da se lotimo interpretativne analize. Kriminološki prispevek k taki analizi mora težiti za tem, da preišče sistem ali pravila ravnanja tistih plasti družbe, ki prispevajo najbolj disproportionalno ponašanje k tem nasilnim odstopanjem od pravnih norm. V knjigi »Suicide« (Samomor)⁹ poudarja Durkheim »anomijo« in »stopnjo integracije« neke skupine, kateri pripada posameznik, v knjigi »Culture Conflict and Crime« (Kulturni konflikt in hudodelstvo)¹⁰ pa daje Sellinovo razpravljanje o normah ponašanja, o konfliktu norm in o »potencialu odpornosti« morebiti najbolj plodno navodilo za teoretično razlagu odstopanj, ki povzemajo obliko uboja.

Interpretativna analiza vsebuje dve nevarnosti: a) nevarnost, da prekoracimo meje empiričnih podatkov, zbranih kot odgovor na postavljeno hipotezo¹¹; b) nevarnost induktivnega posploševanja iz podatkov, ki ima za posledico navadno tautologijo¹². Glede na prvo nevarnost lahko sociolog razmišlja nekako

⁷ Kot na primer opisano v Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, str. 41—42.

⁸ Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958.

⁹ Durkheim, nav. d.

¹⁰ Thorsten Sellin, *Culture Conflict and Crime*, New York, N. Y., Social Science Research Council Bulletin 41, 1938.

¹¹ Glej C. Wright Millsovo razpravljanje o »veliki teoriji«, 2. poglavje v *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959.

¹² Kritiki Freudove psihologije kaj hitro pokažejo na to nevarnost v tem teoretičnem sistemu. Glej jedrnato analizo Roberta G. Caldewella Criminology, New York, The Ronland Press Co., 1956, str. 190.

»impresionistično«, »spekulativno«, ali pa ga zavede predhodna, a v bistvu obrobna raziskava, ki jo potem skuša navezati na dobljene podatke s pomočjo teorije. To pa največkrat vodi v zmedo, ki zahteva novih raziskav. Glede na drugo nevarnost pa so omejenost in problemi tautologije predobro znani, da bi jih tu obravnavali. S svoje strani menimo, da bi bilo treba oba pristopa za razlago spojiti le v tolikšni meri, da ne bi vsebovala prevare in nevarnosti obeh pristopov, marveč bi združevala le prednosti obeh. Poglejmo, kam nas to privede glede na interpretativno analizo uboja kot oblike najbolj skrajnega odstopanja od družbenih norm. Poskušali bomo ostati v mejah, ki jih tvorijo empirično zbrana dejstva, in poskušali bomo, da se ne bi izgubili v spekulativnem razmišljjanju, ki sicer rado spaja zbrana, toda nepovezana dejstva brez podpore empiričnih medsebojnih zvez.

Obstajata dve osnovni vrsti naklepnega uboja: a) premišljen uboj,¹³ b) uboj v navalu strasti ali uboj kot rezultat človekove namere, da stori hudo, toda brez namere, da bi ubil.¹⁴ Uboj, ki ga je storil nekdo, ki je spoznan kot psihopat, pravno neprišteven ali abnormen v psihiatričnem smislu, pomeni hudo klinično odstopanje od norme in tako takšna oseba po navadi ni odgovorna za svoje ponašanje ter je ne moremo kaznovati. Takšnih primerov pri našem razpravljanju ne bomo jemali v obzir.

Verjetno je manj kot 5% vseh poznanih ubojev premišljenih, načrtih in namernih. Osebe, ki jih storijo, so po navadi spoznane za epizodične storilce kaznivih dejanj, ki niso nikoli poprej imeli opravka s kazenskim zakonikom. Ker gre za redka kazniva dejanja, ki jih največkrat zamislijo racionalno misleči posamezniki, navadno ostanejo takšni uboji neodkriti. Menimo, da bi bilo treba za takšne primere uporabljati drugačno analizo, kot pa jo uporabljamo v tem sestavku.¹⁵

¹³ William F. Hoffman, Pennsylvania Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 4. izdaja Wynnewood, Penna., Wm. F. Hoffman, 1952, str. 121.

¹⁴ Prav tam, str. 112.

¹⁵ Bilo bi koristno proučiti umor v »srednjem razredu« — epizodični, načrtni, razumski umor — z istega vidika, kakor ga uporablja Cressey pri raziskavi poneverbe (Donald Cressey, Other People's Money, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1935). Če razčlenimo Cresseyjev dokončno revidirani zahtevek in ga uporabimo na umor v »srednjem razredu«, moremo reči: Te osebe pojmujejo same sebi kot da imajo problem, ki je nerazrešljiv. Zavedajo se, da se ta problem lahko skrivaj reši s krštvijo norm srednjega razreda. Zmožne so uporabiti za svoje lastno ravnanje v tej situaciji takšne racionalizacije, ki jih uporabljajo, da zravnajo svoje pojmovanje o samih sebi kot osebah, ki so poslušne zakonom, s pojmovanjem o samih sebi kot ubijalcih.

TEORIJA O PODKULTURI NASILJA

V tej razpravi nas zanimajo predvsem uboji (približno 90% vseh primerov v Filadelfiji) — hudodelstva iz strasti, nasilni uboji, ki niso premišljeni ali pa predstavljajo psihotično manifestacijo. Kot Cohen¹⁶, ki se je zanimal za prestopke, ki izhajajo iz etike delavskega razreda, smo tudi mi osredotočili svojo pozornost na tiste uboje, ki v celotnem številu odločno prevladujejo.

Teze, ki se nanašajo na odnos med frustracijo in agresijo, na splošne ekološke medsebojne odnose in na anomijo, ne pojasnjujejo povsem zadovoljivo vseh oblik naklepnega uboja. Ekologija dobro služi, toda le pri sklepanju, tako da ne more biti pomembna za normativno strukturo družbe. Anomija, pa najsi bo definirana kot pomanjkanje norm (kar je dvomljivo) ali kot konflikt z normami oziroma z normativnimi cilji in sredstvi zanje¹⁷ ali, kot jo ponovno definira Powell, »brezcilnost«, se ne sklada z empiričnimi podatki o uboju. Iz koncepta anomije bi moralno izhajati, da bi morali tisti posamezniki, ki imajo položaj »obrobnih ljudi« glede na družbeno organizacijo, ki torej skrivajo v sebi anomijo v psihičnem pomenu, izvrševati najvišje število ubojev. Dejstva pa zavračajo takšno trditev. Anomija kot kulturni konflikt ali konflikt z normami opozarja, da obstoji neki družbeni segment (pretežno sistem vrednot meščanskega razreda — srednjega sloja), njemu nasproten oziroma z njim v konfliktu pa manjši del družbene skupnosti, oba segmenta pa sta v isti kulti. Takšen koncept anomije lahko uporabimo, če govorimo o podkulturah kot idealnih tipih ali duševnih sintezah. Toda če prenesemo ta pristop k normativnemu konfliktu z družbene na individualno raven, se ne sklada z oblikami že značnih psiholoških in socioloških podatkov. Pri takem pristopu bi morali predpostavljati, da so družbeno najbolj gibljivi posamezniki in družine največkrat zapleteni v uboje oziroma da so osebe, ki bi prešle iz sistema z nižjimi normami k sistemu s širše veljavnimi normami, največkrat storile to obliko nasilnega dejanja. Pri takšnem načinu razmišljanja pridemo do logičnih nedoslednosti, hkrati pa tudi ni nobenih podatkov, ki bi kazali visok odstotek ubojev med osebami, ki težijo za tem, da bi se v družbi više povzpele.

¹⁶ Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1955.

¹⁷ Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pregledana izdaja, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, str. 131—194.

¹⁸ Elwin H. Powell, »Occupation, Status, and Suicide: Toward a Redefinition of Anomie«, American Sociological Review, 23 (april 1958), str. 131—139.

Strinjam se, da obstoje nasprotja med sistemski vrednotenja, to se pravi, da obstoje nasprotje med prevladajočim sistemom vrednot v določeni kulturi in nekaterimi podkulturnimi enotami. Toda uboje med osebami iz podkulturnega območja, ki se razlikuje od prevladujočega kulturnega območja, ne moremo razložiti s frustracijo, ki naj bi bila posledica neuspeha pri doseganju višjih normativnih ciljev, posledica neuspeha, da bi določene rezultate dosegli z normativnimi sredstvi, niti jih ne moremo razložiti z individualnimi psihološkimi pogoji anomije. Pretežno število ubojev se zgodi v relativno homogeni skupini v katerikoli večji naseljeni skupnosti. Sistem vrednot takšne skupine tvori podkulturo nasilja. Tega koncepta sem se le bežno dotaknil v *Vzorci za naklepni ubo*.¹⁹ Če podkultura nasilja obstoji (skošali bomo pokazati, da empirični podatki kažejo na njen obstoj), moremo predpostavljati, da bo tem večja verjetnost za nasilno ponašanje, čim večja je stopnja integracije posameznika v podkulturo nasilja. Lahko trdimo, da obstoje neposreden odnos med številom ubojev in stopnjo integracije s podkulturo nasilja, ki ji posameznik pripada.²⁰

Podatki o ubojevih v Filadelfiji kažejo značilno²¹ visok odstotek teh dejanj med določenimi družbeno pomembnimi skupinami: moški (10,2), nebelci (24,6) in starostna doba 20 — 24 let (12,6). Še več, nad 90% vseh storilcev izhaja iz nižjih družbeno-ekonomskih plast. Podobne številke lahko najdemo tudi v mnogih drugih deželah. Induktivno sklepanje, ki izhaja iz teh podatkov, nas pripelje do ugotovitve, da mora biti podkultura nasilja pri eni skupini mnogo bolj očitna kot pri

drugi skupini, ker ima ena izmed teh skupin pomembno višji odstotek ubojev. Črnci na primer kot družbeno vidna (če že ne genetično spoznavna) skupina imajo znatno večji odstotek ubojev kot pa belci. Če se približamo raznolikosti socialnih variacij s terminologijo o naraščajoči specifičnosti, ki jo kaže homogenost skupin, potem vidimo, da naraščajo uboje v določenih skupinah, ki so tipične po rasi, spolu in starosti. To dejstvo nam pokaže ekvivalentni narast vrednosti nasilja, ki ga najdemo v podkulturi, iz katere te skupine izhajajo. Taka skupina z najvišjim odstotkom ubojev so moški črnci v starosti od 20 do 24 let, katerih udeležba pri ubojevih znaša 92,5% v primerjavi s 24,6% vseh ubojev, ki so jih storili črnci, in 1,8% ubojev, ki so jih storili belci. Seveda je možno da razložimo ta odkritja na več načinov. V našem poskusu bi z identifikacijo skupin z najvišjim odstotkom ubojev našli tudi najvišjo stopnjo podkulture nasilja. Če našo pozornost osredotočimo na to skupino, bomo morali raziskati vrednost, ki jo ima človeško življenje v sistemu vrednot te podkulture, reakcije, ki jih lahko pričakujemo na določene vrste dražljajev, splošno strukturo osebnosti itd. V naši originalni študiji smo nakazali:

da so slučajno obreganje, malenkostna neprimerna opazka ali pa orožje v rokah nasprotnika tisti dražljaji, na katere črnci in belci, moški in ženske, različno reagirajo. Različne družbene kategorije gledajo različno na takšne reakcije in ta gledanje lahko označimo z »definiranimi situacijami«. Od moškega pričakujemo po navadi, da bo branil ime in čast svoje matere, kreposti ženske in da ne bo sprejel ponizjučih opazk na račun svoje rase (tudi od pripadnika iste rase ne), svoje starosti ali moškosti. Hitra odločitev za fizični pretep kot sredstvo obrambe, izraz poguma ali drznosti, je, kot je videti, kulturni izraz zlasti moških obeh ras, ki pripadajo nižjim družbeno-ekonomskim plastem. Sistem vrednot srednjega razreda in višjih slojev družbe prehaja v legalna pravila, ki večkrat prekašajo podkulturne norme, in smatra večino družbenih in osebnostnih dražljajev, ki povzročajo agresivno razpoloženje pri nižjih slojih, za prostaško. Tako obstoji nasproje med mnogimi ljudskimi prepričanji pri nižjih plasteh družbe, zlasti pri moških obeh ras, na eni strani in pravnimi normami srednjega razreda, po katerih naj bi živel, na drugi strani.²²

¹⁹ Wolfgang, nav. d., str. 328—331.

²⁰ To se razlikuje od »moči sistema odnosov«, ki ga obravnavata Henry in Short v svoji analizi (Andrew F. Henry in James F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1954, str. 16—18, 91—92, 124—125). Glede Henryjevega in Shortovega predloga glej Wolfgang, nav. d., str. 278—279. Poskus Gibbsa in Martina, da bi ocenili Durkheimovo razmerje do »stopnje integracije«, je pravilna analiza tega problema. Podkultura nasilja, integriranega okoli neke posamezne vrednote ali sistema vrednot, ima lahko pokazatelje integracije, ki so povsem različni od tistih, na katere so sklicujeta zgoraj omenjena avtorja (Jack P. Gibbs in Walter T. Martin, »A Theory of Status Integration and Its Relationship to Suicide«, *American Sociological Review*, 23 (april 1958), str. 140—147).

²¹ V originalni študiji se nanaša izraz »pomemben« na statistiko testov, navadno neparametričnih, z mejo verjetnosti pri .05 ali v nekaterih primerih pri .01.

²² Wolfgang, nav. d., str. 65—78; pri primerjanju specifičnih deležev rase, spola in starosti je višji delež med moškimi črnci očiten. Za starostna leta 20—24: moški črnci (92,5), ženske črnke (12,4), moški belci (8,2), ženske belke (1,2).

²³ Prav tam, str. 188—189.

Obstoj podkulture nasilja ne moremo »dokazati« drugače kot z raziskovanjem družbenih skupin in posameznikov, ki kažejo najvišji odstotek nasilnih dejanj. Seveda ni potrebno, da bi proučevali zgolj eno nacionalno ali etnično skupino. Nasprotno, obstoj podkulture nasilja bi morda lahko dobil svojo potrditev celo pri skupinah, ki jih še ne moremo šteti za kulturne. Vzeli smo uboj za najbolj akuten in najbolj viden primer za potrditev naše teze, omejujoč našo analizo na sociološke podatke. Najvišji odstotki posilstev, telesnih poškodb in pripakov zaradi telesnih poškodb med temi skupinami z visokim odstotkom ubojev so seveda le empiričen dodatek k razpravljanju o podkulturi nasilja. Sosečina in skupna nastanitev teh skupin pa daje sociološko-psihološki pečat integraciji te podkulture in potrjuje Sutherlandovo tezo o »diferencialni asociaciji«²⁴ oziroma ponovno psihološko formulacijo iste teorije s terminologijo procesa učenja. Vse to lahko ustrezno uporabimo, da bi popolneje opisali to podkulturo v njeni intenzivnosti, trajnosti, ponavljajočem se ravnanju in pogostosti. Čim bolj temeljito je posameznik prepojen s to podkulturo, tem bolj pogosto se oklepa njenih pravil in jih prisvaja svoji lastni osebni podkulturi. Tako je lahko hiter poseg po orožju nujen za obrambo pred drugimi ljudmi iz istega okolja, ki prav tako nasilno reagirajo. Nošenje nožev ali drugih obrambnih sredstev postane veljaven simbol pripravljenosti, udeleževati se nasilja in ga pričakovati od drugih, ter pripravljenosti na maščevanje. Stopnjo integracije posameznika s podkulturo nasilja lahko merimo delno tako, da uporabimo uradne dokumente o kršenju zakona. Privrženost k nasilju kažejo poleg ubojev tudi višji odstotek aretacij med skupinami, ki pripadajo podkulturi nasilja, zaradi drugih nasilnih kaznivih dejanj in visok odstotek povratništva prav zaradi teh dejanj.

Tako postane odkrito fizično nasilje splošno pričakovana reakcija na določene dražljaje. Vendar v tem primeru ne gre samo za strogo podrejanje zahtevam in pričakovanjem drugih oseb, kot to menita Henry in Short²⁵ in kar naj bi vodilo k večji verjetnosti za uboj. Znatna privrženost družin meščanskega razreda sistemu vrednot njihovega socialnega okolja je izzvala mnoge diskusije.

²⁴ Edwin H. Sutherland in Donald Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, 5. izdaja, Philadelphia, Lippincott, Co., 1955, str. 74—81.

²⁵ Henry in Short, nav. d., str. 102. Gledate prav iste točke konformnosti glej ugotovitev Jacksona Tobyja, »Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the Predatory Behavior of Hoodlums«, *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 48 (maj-junij 1957), str. 12—17.

Nas pa zanima predvsem vrednota nasilnosti, ki je integralen del podkulture, v kateri srečujemo visok odstotek ubojev. Podrejanje tej vrednoti, ki je rezultat integracije posameznika s podkulturo in njegove osebne strukture ne pa le kruto podrejanje samo po sebi, daje poseben pomen podkulturi nasilja.

Ce je nasilje splošna podkulturna reakcija na določen dražljaj, potem mora obstajati celo kazen za odstopanje od teh podkulturnih pravil ponašanja. Sorazmerno nenasilnega posameznika navadno izobčijo.²⁶ Toda če to ni mogoče docela storiti zaradi stanovanjskih razmer, potem ga navadno obravnava s prezirom in ravnodušnostjo. Tisti, ki so ga poprej šteli za pripadnika svoje skupine, a se je tej upri oziroma odtegnil njenemu vplivu, postane izobčenec, ki predstavlja nevarnost in se ga je treba izogniti. Ce se takšne posameznik odtuji iz prejšnjega okolja, navadno ne stori nobenih opisanih kaznivih dejanj več, čeprav jih izvršujejo njegovi prijatelji, sorodniki in znanci. Ce pa še vedno vzdržuje stike s prejšnjim okoljem, a ne reagira na morebitne nasilne razmere, kaj lahko postane žrtev nasprotnika, ki priznava vrednoto nasilja.

Brez pretiravanja lahko trdim, da more celotna kultura sprejeti vrednoto nasilja kot eno izmed oblik svojih norm, da zahteva pridarnost k nasilju in odstopanje celo kaznuje. V primeru vojne sprejme celoten narod načelo nasilja proti sovražniku. Nenasilni državljan, ki postane vojak, sprejme to vrednoto kot notranjo spodbudo za ubijanje. To je seveda selektivno ubijanje sovražnika in se v tem razlikuje od uboja. Vendar je tudi naklepni uboj lahko selektiven in diskriminacijski. Literature, ki kažejo na medskupinski značaj uboja, je na pretek. In kot v uboju na fronti, kjer nastajajo situacije »ali jaz ali on«, obstoje podobni odnosi in reakcije tudi pri udeležencih ubojev. Proučevanje filadelških primerov kaže, da je imelo 65% ubjalcev in 47% njihovih žrtev poprej opravka s policijo in so že kdaj poprej bili aretirani. Tako poznamo primere, ko se dva posameznika, ki priznavata vrednoto nasilja zapleteta v boj in mnogokrat le načakujejo odloča o tem, kdo je ubijalec in kdo je njegova žrtev. Po drugi strani pa je miroljuben človek v vsakem primeru kaznovan zaradi drugačnega razpoloženja skupine, ki podpira nasilje, bodisi tako, da je izobčen, bodisi izoliran (v priporu zaradi zavestnega nasprotovanja v času vojne). Ce pa še nadalje ostane v istem okolju, lahko

²⁶ Umik iz skupine se lahko izvrši po deviantovi nameri in želji ali pa kot odgovor na reakcijo skupine. Primerjaj Robert A. Dentler in Kai T. Erickson, »The Functions of Deviance in Groups«, *Social Problems*, 7 (jesen 1959), str. 98—107.

postane žrtev krogle ali noža nekoga, ki se podreja vrednoti nasilja.

Potreba po agresiji in pripravljenost za nasilje pri posamezniku, ki pripada podkulturni nasilja, mora imeti psihološke osnove v osebnostnih potezah in ponašanju. To seveda vodi k diferencialni psihologiji posameznikov v podkulturni nasilja. Dejstvo, da posameznik pripada specifični podkulturni, ki jo karakterizira pripravljenost, uporabiti silo, bo prisililo človeka, da zavzame posebno stališče do okolja in njegovih dražljajev. Spremembe v okolju, neprestana izzivanja in dnevne frustracije, ki bi jih moral reševati prilagoditveni mehanizem posameznika, spoznamo v podkulturni nasilja za reakcije v smislu groženj, agresivnosti, takojšnje obrambe in protiagresije. S primernimi psihološkimi metodami bi lahko proučili pravkar navedeno hipotezo. Stagnerjevo²⁷ delo o industrijskem konfliktu kaže podoben pristop, seveda na drugačnem področju. Takšen ugotovljiv pristop bi zelo mnogo pripomogel k raziskavi psiholoških aspektov agresije, o kateri menimo, da jo vedno izzovejo ustrezni zunanjii dražljaji.²⁸

Individualni, klinični pristop k proučevanju delinkventov, ki ga predlaga Di Tullio²⁹, lahko s pomočjo daljših raziskav posameznikov, ki pripadajo podkulturni nasilja, poveča nozografijo te skupine, hkrati pa pripomore k ostrejšemu razlikovanju med njenimi komponentami in pa psihopatološkimi primeri. Tudi za to poslednjo skupino lahko podkulturni činitelji, ki temelje na nasilnosti in agresivnosti, odigrajo odločilno vlogo v usmerjanju abnormalnih reakcij proti kriminalnemu ponašanju.

ZAKLJUČEK IN POVZETEK

V tem sestavku smo na kratko očrtali teorijo o podkulturni nasilja kot interpretativno analizo empiričnih podatkov, ki se našajo na naklepni uboj. Gre za odstopanje od sprejetih, zakonitih družbenih norm, ki visoko vrednotijo človekovo življenje in obvezujejo ljudi k nenasilnemu ponašanju. Načavnost podkulture nasilja v družbi smo ugo-

tovili iz pomembno visokega odstotka ubojev med določenimi družbenimi skupinami. Skupnost pomembno povezanih varijacij te podkulturne okrepljuje hipotezo o njenem obstoju. Čim bolj je integrirana ta podkulturna, tem bolj globoko je zasidrana vrednota nasilnosti v posamezniku. Pričakovana oblika nasilnega reagiranja pa se v posebnih okoliščinah večkrat spremeni v nenasilno ponašanje in s tem v odstopanje od podkulturne. To odstopanje pa ima za posledico izobčenje in druge kazni, ki so podobne kaznim za odstopanje od širše priznanih družbenih norm.

Pri tem nismo poskušali pojasniti, zakaj pride do takšne podkulturne nasilja v neki družbi. Takšen poskus bi nedvomno zahteval analizo družbeno razrednih in rasnih odnosov, ki bi zajemal kot pomembne činitelje tudi poklic, nastanitev in drugo družbeno razlikovanje, pa tudi izolacijo od določenih drugih kulturnih skupin. Upoštevanje teorije o vlogi posameznika, upoštevanje posebnosti skupin, zlasti pa upoštevanje vzgoje otrok, ki sloni na fizičnem kaznovanju in ki sproži zgornje oblike agresije³⁰, bi pomagale pri iskanju vzročnih faktorjev kot tudi metod za odstranjevanje takšnih faktorjev. Menimo, da bi nadaljni poskusi za identificiranje podkulturne nasilja kot pomemben prispevek k razumevanju ubojev in drugih agresivnih kaznivih dejanj bili najuspešnejši, če bi se v naši analizi osredotočili na nastajanje in opisovanje sistema vrednot te podkulturne.

Razpršitev skupin, ki sestavljajo podkulturno nasilja, bi oslabila nasilnost. Večje ekonomskie možnosti, svoboda naseljevanja, integracija članov teh skupin v ostalo družbo in njen sistem vrednot bi lahko pripomogli k razbitju ali vsaj omiljenju podkulturne nasilja. V načrtu za resocializacijo, zlasti pri uporabi individualne ali skupinske psihoterapije, bi morali vključiti tudi poskus, kako bi odpravili posameznikovo pripadnost podkulturni nasilja in njegovo drugačno vrednotevne sveta.³¹

²⁷ Martin Gold, »Suicide, Homicide and the Socialization of Aggression«, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (maj 1958), str. 651—661. Glej tudi Albert K. Cohen in James F. Short, Jr., »Research in Delinquent Subcultures«, *The Journal of Social Issues*, 14 (1958), str. 20—37.

²⁸ O perceptualnih faktorjih v strukturi osebnosti in v tretmanu glej obsežno razpravljanje: Robert R. Blake in G. V. Ramsey (Eds), *Perception: An Approach to Personality*, New York, Ronald Press, 1951. Tudi: Ross Stagner, »Le Teorie della Personalità«, *Rassegna di Psicologia Generale e Clinica*, 2 (1957), str. 34—48.

²⁷ Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Industrial Conflict*, New York, Wiley, 1956.

²⁸ John Paul Scott, *Aggression*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, str. 44—64.

²⁹ B. Di Tullio, *Principi di Criminologia Clinica e Psichiatria Forense*, Rim, Ist. di Medicina Sociale, 1960.

Subculture of Violence: An Interpretive Analysis of Homicide*

Marvin E. Wolfgang

Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Franco Ferracuti, M. D.

Institute of Criminal Anthropology
University of Rome, Italy
Social Science Research Center
University of Puerto Rico

Problems of Interpretive Analysis

One of the most socially visible deviations from our conduct norms is the taking of human life by intentional murder or by voluntary manslaughter.¹ Like all human behavior, this kind of deviation must be viewed in terms of the cultural context from which it springs. De Champneuf,² Guerry,³ Quetelet⁴ early in the nineteenth century emphasized the necessity to examine physique sociale, or social phenomena characterized by "externality", if the scientist is to understand or interpret crime, suicide, prostitution and other deviant behavior. Without promulgating a sociological fatalism, analysis of broad macroscopic correlates in this way may obscure the dynamic elements of the phenomenon and result in the ecological fallacy to which Selvin⁵ refers. Yet, because of wide individual variations, the clinical, idiosyncratic approach does not necessarily aid in arriving at Weber's *Verstehen*, or meaningful adequate understanding of regularities, uniformities, or patterns of interaction. And it is this kind of understanding we seek when we examine either deviation from, or conformity to, the normative structure.⁶

Confronted with descriptive and test statistics, with validated hypotheses and some con-

firmed replications of propositions regarding patterns in criminal homicide reported in recent research,⁸ interpretive analysis is now required. A criminological contribution to such an analysis must seek to examine the value system, or conduct norms, of those segments of the community that contribute most disproportionately to the incidence of this form of violent deviation from the legal norms. In *Suicide*,⁹ Durkheim's emphasis on "anomie" and the "degree of integration" of the group to which the individual belongs, and in *Culture Conflict and Crime*,¹⁰ Sellin's discussion of conduct norms, conflict of norms, and the "resistance potential" of norms, provide probably the most fruitful direction of analysis for theoretical interpretation of deviation that takes the form of homicide.

There are two common inherent dangers in interpretive analysis: (A) the danger of going beyond the confines of empirical data collected in response to some stated hypothesis,¹¹ and (B) the danger of interpretation that produces generalizations emerging inductively from the data and that results in tautologous reasoning.¹² Relative to the first type of danger, the social scientist incurs the risk of "impressionistic", "speculative" thinking, or of using previous peripheral research and trying to link them to his own data by theoretical ties that often result in knotted confusion calling for further research. Relative to the second danger, the limitations and problems of tautologies are too well known to elaborate. We are suggesting that these two approaches to interpretation be combined in small degrees that do not compound the fallacies or dangers of both, but that unite the benefits of each. Let us see how and where this leads us with respect to an interpretive analysis of criminal homicide as a form of extreme deviation. We shall try to stay within the limits imposed by the empirical social facts,

* Paper presented at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 29-31, August 1960.

¹ Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*, New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958, p. 210; see also pp. 23-24.

² For an interesting account of the contribution of M. de Guerry de Champneuf, see M. C. Elmer, "Century-Old Ecological Studies in France", *American Journal of Sociology*, 39 (July, 1933), pp. 63-70.

³ A. M. Guerry, *Essai sur la statistique morale de la France*, Paris, 1833.

⁴ A. Quetelet, *Sur l'Homme et le développement de ses facultés; essai de physique sociale*, Paris: Bachelier, 1835. For excellent summarization and interpretation of the influence of Quetelet, Guerry, and others during the early nineteenth century, see Alfred Lindesmith and Yale Levin, "The Lombrosian Myth in Criminology", *American Journal of Sociology*, 42 (March, 1937), pp. 653-671.

enth century, and Durkheim⁵ later led the way

⁵ Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951.

⁶ Hanan C. Selvin, "Durkheim's Suicide and Problems of Empirical Research", *The American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (May, 1958), pp. 607-619.

⁷ As Described, for example, in Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951, pp. 41-42.

⁸ Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958.

⁹ Durkheim, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Thorsten Sellin, *Culture Conflict and Crime*, New York, N. Y.: Social Science Research Council Bulletin 41, 1938.

¹¹ See C. Wright Mills' discussion of "grand theory", Chapter 2 in *The Sociological Imagination*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

¹² Critics of Freudian psychology are quick to point to this danger in that theoretical system. See Robert G. Caldwell's succinct analysis in *Criminology*, New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956, p. 190.

yet not become lost in speculative reasoning that combines accumulated, but unrelated, previously known facts for which there is no empirically supportive link.

There are two basic kinds of criminal homicide: (A) premeditated, felonious, intentional murder;¹³ (B) slaying in the heat of passion, or killing as a result of intent to do harm but without intent to kill.¹⁴ A slaying committed by one recognized as psychotic, legally insane, or by a psychiatrically designated abnormal subject involves clinical deviates who are generally not held responsible for their behavior, and who, therefore, are not considered culpable. We are eliminating these cases from our present discussion.

Probably less than 5 per cent of all known homicides are premeditated, planned intentional killings, and the individuals who commit them are most likely to be episodic offenders who have never had prior contact with the criminal law. Because they are rare crimes often planned by rationally functioning individuals perhaps they are more likely to remain undetected. We believe that a type of analysis different from that presented here might be applicable to these cases.¹⁵

Emergent Theory of a Subculture of Violence

Our major concern is with the bulk of homicide (about 90 per cent of the Philadelphia cases) — the passion crimes, the violent slaying that are not premeditated or psychotic manifestations. Like Cohen¹⁶ who was concerned principally with most delinquency that arises from the «working class» ethic, so we are focusing on the preponderant kind of homicide.

Theses related to frustration-aggression, general ecologic correlates, and anomie are not entirely satisfactory in explaining patterns in criminal homicide. The causal nexus between frustration and aggression that ends in homicide

¹³ William F. Hoffman, *Pennsylvania Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure*, 4th ed., Wynnewood, Penna.: Wm. F. Hoffman, 1952, p. 121.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁵ It may be profitable to study «middle class» murder — the episodic, planned, rational murder — from the same perspective that Cressey uses in examining embezzlement (Donald Cressey, *Other People's Money*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953). Paraphrasing Cressey's final revised postulate and applying it to «middle class» murder, we might say: These persons conceive of themselves as having a problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the middle-class norm, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation rationalization which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as law-abiding persons with their conceptions of themselves as slayers.

¹⁶ Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955.

has not been specified and the different reactions to frustration of human subjects have not been accounted for. Ecology performs a valuable service but only inferentially points to the importance of the normative structure. Anomie, whether defined as the absence of norms (which is doubtful conceptualism), the conflict of norms (either normative goals or means),¹⁷ or the redefinition by Powell as «meaninglessness»,¹⁸ does not coincide with empirical evidence on homicide. The concept of anomie would have to postulate that those individuals with a «marginal man» status, who harbor psychic anomie that reflects (or causes) social anomie, have the highest rates of homicide. Data reject this contention. Anomie as culture conflict, or conflict of norms, suggests that there is one segment (the prevailing middle class value system) of a given culture whose value system is the antithesis of, or in conflict with, another smaller segment of the same culture. This conceptualism of anomie is a useful tool for referring to subcultures as ideal types, or mental constructs. But to transfer this normative conflict approach from the social to the individual level, theoretically making the individual a repository of culture conflict, again does not conform to the patterns of known psychological and sociological data. Such an approach would be forced to hypothesize that socially mobile individuals and families would be most frequently involved in homicide, or that persons moving from a formerly embraced subvalue system to the predominant communal value system would commit this form of violent deviation in greatest numbers. Not only is there logical inconsistency in this position, but there are no homicide data that show high rates among persons manifesting higher social aspirations in terms of occupational or other forms of mobility.

That there is a conflict of value systems we agree; that is, there is a conflict between a prevailing culture value and some subcultural entity. But commission of homicide among those actors from the subculture at variance with the prevailing culture cannot be explained in terms of frustration due to failure to attain normative goals of the latter, in terms of inability to succeed with normative procedures (means) for attaining those goals, nor in terms of an individual psychological condition of anomie. There is a preponderance of homicide, or highest rates of homicide, among a relatively homogeneous subcultural group in any large urban community.

¹⁷ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, revised ed., Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, pp. 131—194.

¹⁸ Elwin H. Powell, «Occupation, Status, and Suicide: Toward a Redefinition of Anomie», *American Sociological Review*, 23 (April, 1958), pp. 131—139.

The value system of this group, we are contending, constitutes a **subculture of violence**. One of us has only briefly alluded to this concept in *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*.¹⁹ If there exists a subculture of violence (and we shall attempt to show that empirical data indicate its existence), then we must further propose that the greater the degree of integration of the individual into this subculture the higher the likelihood that his behavior will often be violent; or, we may assert that there is a direct relationship between rates of homicide and the degree of integration of the subculture of violence to which the individual belongs.²⁰

The Philadelphia homicide data indicate significantly²¹ high rates among certain socially meaningful groups: males (10.2), non-whites (24.6), and the age group 20-24 (12.6). Moreover, over 90 per cent of all offenders are from the lower socio-economic classes.²² Similar figures can be found for other societies in many countries. Inductive reasoning emerging out of these data suggests that because some groups have significantly higher rates of homicide than do others, the existence of a subculture of violence must be significantly more obvious among the former. For example, Negroes, as a socially visible (if not genetically identifiable) ethnic group have significantly higher rates of homicide than do whites. When we approach a variety of social variables in terms of increasing specificity of the homogeneity, we find that the rate of homicide rises in certain race-sex-age-specific groups; and this fact in turn suggests an equivalent rise in the value of violence found in the subculture from which these groups emerge. The single race-sex-age group with the highest rate of homicide is among Negro males aged 20-24, whose rate is 92.5 compared to 24.6 for all Negroes and

1.8 for all whites. It is possible, of course, to multiple these specific findings in any variety of ways. We suggest that by identification of groups with the highest rates of homicide we shall find the most intense degree of a subculture of violence; and having focused on this group we shall subsequently be required to examine the value system of this subculture, the importance of human life in the scale of values, the kinds of expected reactions to certain types of stimuli, the perceptual differences in the evaluation of the stimuli, the general personality structure, etc. In the original study it has been pointed out that:

...the significance of a jostle, a slightly derogatory remark, or the appearance of a weapon in the hands of an adversary are stimuli differentially perceived and interpreted by Negroes and whites, males and females. Social expectations of response in particular types of social interaction result in differential »definitions of the situation«. A male is usually expected to defend the name and honor of his mother, the virtue of womanhood... and to accept no derogation about his race (even from a member of his own race), his age, or his masculinity. Quick resort to physical combat as a measure of daring, courage, or defense of status appears to be a cultural expression, especially for lower socio-economic class males of both races. When such a culture norm response is elicited from an individual engaged in social interplay with others who harbor the same response mechanism, physical assaults, altercations, and violent domestic quarrels that result in homicide are likely to be common. The upper-middle and upper social class value system defines and codifies behavioral norms into legal rules that often transcend subcultural mores, and considers many of the social and personal stimuli that evoke a combative reaction in the lower classes as »trivial«. Thus, there exists a cultural antipathy between many folk rationalizations of the lower class, and of males of both races, on the one hand, and the middle-class legal norms under which they live, on the other.²³

¹⁹ Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-331.

²⁰ This is different from the »strength of the relational system« discussed by Henry and Short in their provocative analysis (Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954, pp. 16-18, 91-92, 124-125). Relative to the Henry and Short suggestion, see Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279. The attempt of Gibbs and Martin to measure Durkheim's reference to »degree of integration« is a competent analysis of the problem. A subculture of violence integrated around a given value item or value system may require quite different indices of integration than those to which these authors refer (Jack P. Gibbs and Walter T. Martin, »A Theory of Status Integration and Its Relationship to Suicide«, *American Sociological Review* 23, (April, 1958), pp. 140-147).

²¹ In the original study »significant« refers to test statistics, usually non-parametric, with confidence limits at .05 or in some cases, .01.

²² Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-78 comparing race-sex-age-specific rates, the higher rate among Negro males is obvious. For ages 20-24: Negro males (92.5); Negro females (12.4); white males (8.2); white females (1.2).

We cannot »prove« the existence of a subculture of violence save by examination of the social groups and of the individuals that experience highest rates of violent manifestations. This need not be, of course, confined to the study of one national or ethnic group. On the contrary, the existence of a subculture of violence could perhaps receive even noncultural confirmation. We have used criminal homicide as the most acute and highly reportable example of this type of »proof«, limiting our analysis, at this stage, to the sociological data. Some circularity of thought is here employed for purposes of maintaining logical consistency, because we are using homicide rates to specify our dependent factor (homicide), and also to infer our indepen-

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

dent factor(s), the existence of a subculture of violence. Highest rates of rape, aggravated assaults, persistency in arrests for assaults (recidivism) among these same groups with high rates of homicide are, however, empirical addenda to the contention of a subculture of violence. Residential propinquity of these same groups reinforces the sociopsychological impact of integration of this subculture, and Suntherland's thesis of »differential association«²⁴ or a psychological reformulation of the same theory in terms of learning process could be effectively used to describe more fully this impact in its intensity, duration, repetition, frequency. The more thoroughly integrated the individual is into this subculture, the more intensely he embraces its proscriptions of behavior, its conduct norms and integrates them in his personality structure. Thus, ready access to weapons may become essential for protection against others in this milieu who respond in similarly violent ways, and the carrying of knives or other protective devices becomes a common symbol of willingness to participate in and to expect violence, and to be ready for its retaliation. The degree of integration may be measured partly by resort to public records of contact with the law — the codified norms on the opposite end of a continuum from violence to non-violence. Thus, the higher arrest rate among the groups that form the subculture of violence, particularly high rates of assault crimes and high rates of recidivism for assault crimes, indicate allegiance to the values of violence.

Thus, overt physical violence becomes a common subculturally expected response to certain stimuli. However, it is not merely rigid conformity to the demands and expectations of other persons, as Henry and Short²⁵ suggest, that results in the high possibility of homicide. Considerable conformity of middle class families to the value system of their social group is a widely discussed contemporary topic. Our concern is with the value of violence that is an integral component of the subculture which experiences high rates of homicide. It is the conformity to this value, as a result of its integration in the personality structure of the subject, and not rigid conformity per se to the expectations of others, that gives important meaning to the subculture of violence.

²⁴ Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, 5th ed., Philadelphia: Lippincott Co., 1955, pp. 74—81.

²⁵ Henry and Short, *op. cit.*, p. 102. On this same point of conformity, see the statement of Jackson Toby, »Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the Predatory Behavior of Hoodlums«, *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 48 (May-June, 1957), pp. 12—17.

If violence is a common subcultural response to certain stimuli, there must exist penalties for deviation from this norm. The comparatively non-violent individual may be ostracized,²⁶ but if social interaction must occur because of residential propinquity, he is most likely to be treated with disdain or indifference. One previously considered a member of the ingroup who has rebelled or retreated from the subculture is now an outgroup member, a possible threat, and one to avoid. Alienation or avoidance takes him out of the normal reach of most homicide attacks that are highly personalized offenses occurring with greatest frequency among friends, relatives, and associates. If social interaction continues, however, the deviant from the subculture who fails to respond to a potentially violent situation may find himself a victim of an adversary who conforms to the violence value.

It is not farfetched to suggest that a whole culture may accept the violence value, demand or encourage adherence to it, and penalize deviation. During periods of war the whole nation accepts the principle of violence against the enemy. The non-violent citizen turned soldier adopts the value as an intimately internalized re-enforcement for his rationalization to kill. This is, of course, selective killing of an enemy, and in this respect is different from most homicide. But criminal homicide is also »selective«, not indiscriminate slaying. There is abundant literature showing the intra-group nature of the homicide drama. And as in combat on the front lines where the »it-was-either-him-or-me« situation arises there are similar attitudes and reactions among participants in homicide. The original study on the Philadelphia subjects found that 65 per cent of the offenders and 47 per cent of the victims had a previous police record of arrests. Here, then, is a situation not unlike that of individual combat in which two individuals committed to the value of violence come together, and in which chance often dictates the identity of the slayer and of the slain. On the other hand, the peaceful non-combatant in both sets of circumstances is penalized because of the allelomimetic behavior of the group supporting violence by his being ostracized as an outgroup member and is segregated (imprisoned, in wartime, as a conscientious objector). If he continues to be involved in social interaction (in the public street or on the front line of combat) with the culture of violence, he may fall victim to the shot or stab from one who embraces the value of violence.

²⁶ Withdrawal from the group may be by the deviant's own design and desire, or by response to the reaction of the group. Cf. Robert A. Dentler and Kai T. Erickson, »The Functions of Deviance in Groups«, *Social Problems*, 7 (Fall, 1959), pp. 98—107.

The internal need for aggression and the readiness to use violence by the individual who belongs to a subculture of violence should find their psychological foundations in personality traits and in attitudes which can, through careful studies, be assessed in such a way as to lead to a differential psychology of these subjects. Psychological tests have been repeatedly employed to study the differential characteristics of criminals and, if the theoretical frame of reference of a subculture of violence is used, it should be possible to sharpen their discriminatory power. The fact that a subject belongs to a specific subculture (in our case, a deviant one), defined by the ready use of violence, will, among other consequences, cause the subject to adopt a differential perception of the environment and of its stimuli. The variations in the surrounding world, the continuous challenges and daily frustrations which are faced and solved by the adaptive mechanism of the individual, have a greater chance of being perceived and reacted upon, in a subculture of violence, as menacing, aggressive stimuli, which call for immediate defense and counter-aggression. This hypothesis lends itself to objective study through appropriate psychological methodologies. The work of Stagner²⁷ on industrial conflict exemplifies a similar approach in a different field. This perceptual approach is of great importance in view of the studies on the physiology of aggression, which seem to prove, in all cases, the need of outside stimulation in order to elicit aggressive behavior.²⁸

The individual, clinical approach to the study of criminals, as proposed by Di Tullio,²⁹ may, through inclusive and prolonged examination of single offenders belonging to a subculture of violence, enlarge the nosography of this group, while at the same time establish a sharper differentiation between its components and the psychopathological cases. For this latter group, the subcultural factors related to violence and aggression may also play a determining role in the type of psychopathological symptoms and in the canalizations of abnormal reactions towards criminal behavior.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has briefly outlined a theory of the subculture of violence as an interpretive analysis of empirical data that describe a recognized form of social deviation — namely, criminal homicide. The deviation is from an ac-

cepted, prevailing legal and communal norm that places high value on human life and non-violent behavior. The presence in society of a subculture of violence has been subsumed from the significantly high rates of homicide among particular groups. The concomitance of meaningfully related variables to this subculture strengthens the contention of its existence. The more integrade this subculture is, the more deeply internalized in the individual is the value of violence. Hence, an expected pattern of violent action and reaction often makes non-violence, in specifically defined situations, a form of deviation from the subculture and results in the ban of penalties similar in type, if not in specific form, to those found in penalties attached to deviation from the larger societal norms.

We have not attempted to explain the cause of the subculture of violence. Such an endeavor undoubtedly involves analysis of social class and race relations that would include residential, occupational, and other social forms of discrimination and cultural isolation as important factors. Some consideration of role theory, reference groups, and particularly child-rearing practices that employ physical punishment and promote early overt aggressive patterns³⁰ would aid the search for causal factors and remedial methods. At this point we are suggesting that further probing analysis of the identified subculture of violence as a meaningful concept in understanding homicide and other assaultive crimes would be most productive if it focused on the creation and description of the value system of this subculture.

Dispersion of the group that shares the subcultural violence value should weaken the value. Through wider economic opportunities, freedom of residential mobility, etc., integration of the group members into the larger society and its predominant value system should function to destroy or at least to mitigate the subculture of violence. In the correctional environment, the treatment program, especially when using individual or group psychotherapy, should try to counterbalance or to eliminate the allegiance of the subject to the subculture of violence and his differential perception of the world.³¹

²⁷ Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Industrial Conflict*, New York, Wiley, 1956.

²⁸ John Paul Scott, *Aggression*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 44—64.

²⁹ B. Di Tullio, *Principi di Criminologia Clinica e Psichiatria Forense*, Rome, Istit. di Medicina Sociale, 1960.

³⁰ Martin Gold, »Suicide, Homicide and the Socialization of Aggression«, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (May, 1958) pp. 651—661. See also, Albert K. Cohen and James F. Short, Jr., »Research in Delinquent Subcultures«, *The Journal of Social Issues*, 14 (1958), pp. 20—37.

³¹ See for a comprehensive discussion of perceptual factors in personality structure and in treatment: Robert R. Blake and G. V. Ramsey (Eds.), *Perception: An Approach to Personality*, New York, Ronald Press, 1951. Also: Ross Stagner, »Le Teorie della Personalità«, *Rassegna di Psicologia Generale e Clinica*, 2 (1957), pp. 34—48.