

Does Community Policing Matter for Police Integrity?

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković¹, Irena Cajner Mraović², Krunoslav Borovec³

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between police integrity and community policing, an issue unexplored in prior studies. A stratified representative sample of 1,315 Croatian police officers participated in a police integrity survey and evaluated seriousness of police misconduct, assessed appropriate and expected discipline, and expressed their willingness to report such behaviour. In addition, the respondents provided their attitudes toward community policing. About one-quarter of the respondents were employed in community policing, while the rest performed more traditional policing roles. Our multivariate models of police misconduct seriousness show that police officers' assignment – be they employed in community policing or in more traditional police roles – was rarely related to their level of police integrity. Similarly, their support for community policing was not significantly related to their evaluations of misconduct seriousness. On the other hand, recognising a behaviour as rule-violating, assuming that other police officers would report the behaviour, and expecting dismissal for the behaviour increased the odds that the respondents would view the behaviour as serious. In addition, gender and supervisory status were not relevant predictors of the evaluations of seriousness, while the length of service was.

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1 Police Integrity and Community Policing

Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) proposed an organisational theory of police misconduct, which postulates that police integrity is a feature of individual police officers, groups of police officers, and police agencies. The theory has four dimensions.

This first dimension of the theory connects the police agency's level of police integrity with the nature and strength of the official rules (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004: 1). Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004: 4) argue that, from the police integrity perspective, it is critical to explore the way in which official rules are made and enforced, as well as how well they are understood and supported by police officers in the agency. Official rules typically involve agency-specific organisational rules and various ordinances, codes, laws, and

constitutional norms that regulate police conduct. Clearly, these official rules not only differ across countries, but also across different police agencies in decentralised systems (Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, & Haberfeld, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015).

Empirical research has shown not only that police officers' recognition of official rules varies across countries as well (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a), but also that some types of police misconduct are more likely to be uniformly prohibited by the rules and recognised as such by the police officers. Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015a) reported that the most serious forms of misconduct, such as theft from a crime scene, falsifying official records, or abusing deadly force, were labeled as rule-violating behavior by the overwhelming majority of the police officers in the samples from 10 countries, as diverse as Australia, Croatia, South Africa, and the United States. On the other hand, there was a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the rule coverage for the least serious forms of misconduct, such as the acceptance of free meals/gifts from merchants and verbal abuse of citizens. While close to 90% of the police officers in the Australian sample evaluated such behaviour as rule-violating, this was the case for only 3% of the police officers in the Thai sample (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a; Phetthong & Kutnjak Ivković, 2015; Portrer, Prenzler, & Hine, 2015).

¹ Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Ph.D., Full Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, USA. E-mail: kutnjak@msu.edu

² Irena Cajner Mraović, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Centre for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb, Croatia. E-mail: icajner@hrstud.hr

³ Krunoslav Borovec, General Police Director Assistant - Head of Police Directorate, Ministry of the Interior, Croatia. E-mail: kborovec@hrstud.hr

The second dimension of the theory connects the police agency's level of police integrity with the quality of the control techniques (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004: 4). Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) argue that police agencies of integrity not only have well-developed control mechanisms, but that they also use them both proactively and retroactively. Such control mechanisms may include education in ethics, integrity testing, and proactive and reactive investigations.

The results of the 10-country comparative study on police integrity (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a) suggest substantial diversity in internal discipline as they reveal that what police officers expect to the discipline their agencies will administer for the same misconduct to be, varies greatly across countries. In particular, Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015a: 364) wrote that, "[b]ased on the evaluations provided by our respondents, some countries create environments in which police officers neither support nor expect dismissal for any of the forms of misconduct described in the questionnaire."

Independent commission investigations into police misconduct (e.g., Christopher Commission, 1991; Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1992) traditionally reveal that low levels of police integrity or widespread police misconduct and ineffective control mechanisms go hand in hand. Not only are the internal mechanisms of control-mechanisms located within police agencies-ineffective, but, in many cases, external ones were ineffective as well. Both, the Knapp Commission (1972) and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1974) argued that the criminal justice system provided protection to police officers who engaged in corrupt activities. When these two independent commissions found that misconduct was widespread, police officers were rarely arrested and tried for corruption (Knapp Commission, 1972; Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974).

The third dimension of the theory connects the police agency's level of police integrity with the success of efforts to curtail the code of silence (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004: 1). While Klockars and colleagues (2004) argued that the code – the unofficial rule that a police officer never reports misconduct by fellow police officers – exists in every police agency, it is typically much weaker in police agencies of high integrity than in those of low integrity. Independent commissions regularly report that the code of silence seems to be the strongest in the subunits of police agencies where misconduct seems to be most widespread (Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994).

In the original U.S. study by Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, Harver and Haberfeld (2000), the authors found large differences in the extent of the code of silence among the 30 agen-

cies in their sample. In fact, they reported that the differences across the 30 police agencies were the largest for one measure of police integrity – the code of silence. In the 14-country comparative study, Klockars and colleagues (2004) note the almost "worldwide prevalence of the code of silence," while, at the same time, they detect substantial variations in its strength across the countries. They write that, "[i]n five of the countries not a single incident of the eleven described in the survey would be very likely to be reported by fellow officers" (Klockars et al., 2004: 17). In addition, very serious examples of corruption, such as accepting a bribe, would likely not be reported in the majority of the countries in the sample (Klockars et al., 2004). Similarly, in a more recent 10-country study, Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015a) also found substantial variability in the strength of the code of silence across countries.

The fourth dimension of the theory connects the police agency's level of police integrity with the influence of the larger social and political environment (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004: 4). The theory proposes that the level of police integrity in a police agency is influenced by the expectations of ethical conduct in the society at large, as well as the strength of external control mechanisms. While the fourth dimension of the theory has not been explicitly tested, Kutnjak Ivković (2015) compared the country's ranking on the Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index and the level of police integrity for the countries included in the Klockars et al. study (Klockars et al., 2004). She concludes that, "the results ... do reveal that police agencies from the countries typically ranked near the top of the Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Scale ... exhibit much higher levels of police integrity than police agencies from countries typically listed toward the bottom of the scale ... or in the middle of the scale ..." (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 26).

Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) propose a theory of police integrity and developed an accompanying methodological approach to the empirical measurement of police integrity. Their survey methodology allows for the exploration of police integrity in a quantitative manner while avoiding the problems associated with direct questions about police misconduct. The questionnaire solicits police officers' responses to hypothetical scenarios describing different examples of police misconduct. The first questionnaire focused mainly on police corruption (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004), while the second included various forms of police misconduct (Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, & Haberfeld, 2006). Over the last two decades, this theoretical and methodological approach has been used to assess police integrity in 25 countries across the world (see, e.g., Klockars et al., 2004; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015; Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015b), including East-

European countries in transition (e.g., Armenia (Kutnjak Ivković & Khechumyan, 2013); Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2005); Croatia (Kutnjak Ivković, 2009; Kutnjak Ivković, Cajner Mraović, & Borovec, 2016; Kutnjak Ivković, Cajner Mraović, & Ivanušec, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars, 2004); Czech Republic (Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2007, 2010); Estonia (Vallmüür, 2015); Hungary (Kremer, 2004); Poland (Haberfeld, 2004); Russia (Cheloukhine, Kutnjak Ivković, Haq, & Haberfeld, 2015); Slovenia (Pagon & Lobnikar, 2004; Pagon, Kutnjak Ivković, & Lobnikar, 2000; Lobnikar & Meško, 2015).

While most of the previous studies explored the state of police integrity in general, others focused on specific issues such as misconduct seriousness (Long, Cross, Shelley, & Kutnjak Ivković, 2013; Kutnjak Ivković, 2004, 2005; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2016), opinions about appropriate and expected discipline (Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivković, Haberfeld, & Peacock, 2016; Kutnjak Ivković, Haberfeld, Kang, Peacock, & Sauerman, 2016), or assessments of the code of silence (Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars, 1998; Pagon & Lobnikar, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivković & Sauerman, 2013; Lobnikar, Prislán, Čuvan, & Meško, 2016; Porter & Prenzler, 2016; Vallmüür, 2016; Westmarland, 2005).

Comparative studies of police seriousness - the measure of police integrity we use in this study - found substantial variation across absolute assessments of seriousness (Klockars et al., 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a). In some cases, the differences across countries tended to be quite large. For example, while police officers in the samples from Armenia, Australia, Croatia, Estonia, Slovenia, South Africa, and South Korea evaluated the theft of a knife from a crime scene as an extremely serious form of police misconduct, police officers in the Russian sample did not find it to be even of medium seriousness (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a). There were also large variations across other scenarios, particularly those describing less serious forms of police misconduct (Klockars et al., 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015b). One such scenario with substantial variation, was the cover-up of a police DUI accident; it clearly reflected different social attitudes toward driving under the influence as was perceived to be among the most serious scenarios in 3 countries and among the least serious scenarios in 4 countries (Klockars et al., 2004).

On the other hand, relative assessments of misconduct seriousness seemed to indicate a uniformity across many countries. In particular, when summarising the evaluations of seriousness across 12 countries, Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, and Haberfeld (2004: 10) note that, "despite substantial differences in absolute scores, the rank order in which police officers from most countries evaluated the seriousness of the scenarios is

remarkably similar." In the subsequent comparison across 10 countries, Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015a) suggest that there might be an underlying hierarchy of seriousness. Specifically, the same three scenarios (stealing from a crime scene, unjustifiably using deadly force, and falsifying official reports) were evaluated as the most serious in the majority of the countries, while three different scenarios (covering up a police DUI accident, accepting gratuities and free meals, and verbally abusing citizens) were consistently evaluated as the least serious (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015a).

Extant research also studied differences between individual-level variables such as race and/or gender (Westmarland, 2005; McDevitt, et al., 2011; Andreescu, Kelling, Voinic, & Tonea, 2012; Lobnikar et al., 2016; Vallmüür, 2016) and rank (Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars, 2000; Pagon & Lobnikar, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković, Klockars, Cajner-Mraović, & Ivanušec, 2002; Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivković, 2012; Lee, Lim, Moore, & Kim, 2013), as well as organizational-level differences, such as district or police administrative differences (Greene, Piquero, Hickman, & Lawton, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2016).

Yet, police integrity studies to date have not engaged in a systematic exploration of the relationship between police integrity and community policing. The U.S. Community Oriented Policing Services Office (COPS, 2012) argued that, "Creating a culture of integrity is an integral part of fostering an environment conducive to problem-solving and community engagement, two of the core components of community policing". Furthermore, "A culture of police integrity is essential in building respect and trust and, in turn, mutual respect and trust between police and citizens are essential to effective crime control" (COPS, 2012). More recently, McDevitt, Farrell and Wolff (2008: 12) proposed that a police agency's external integrity rests on the relation between the police agency and its community stakeholders; "the nature of the relationships between the agency and various community constituencies is particularly important in discussing whether an agency can be considered to possess integrity."

Community policing started to gain popularity primarily in response to concerns about troublesome police-community relations (Cordner, 2014). However, although it has been used for decades in some countries, community policing is a rather vague concept with no clear and straightforward definition. Consequently, there is substantial variability over an understanding of what does and does not constitute community policing (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Cordner (2014) tried to organise the main themes of community policing by putting together common elements into four dimensions of community policing (i.e., philosophical, strategic, tactical, and organisational).

Such a state of disarray in terms of what is regarded as community policing prompted Kappeler and Gaines (2011: 186) to argue that, “little is known about how one might successfully get such a program under way”. Indeed, when there are questions about even the basic concept, it is difficult to develop a program implementing the concept and assess its effectiveness. The challenges associated with both the definition and its implementation became even more challenging in post-socialist countries such as Croatia, in which community policing was typically introduced almost overnight, without detailed analysis of the critical concepts, proper personnel training, and adequate resources (Jere, Sotlar, & Meško, 2012; Keković & Kentera, 2013; Kešetović, 2013; Meško & Lobnikar, 2005; Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013).

This paper explores the relationship between police integrity and community policing, a topic rarely studied. The data were collected in Croatia in 2008/2009, and Croatia constitutes a very illuminating test site for a multitude of reasons. First, it has a centralised police system with more than 10,000 police officers, a system in which the official rules are consistent across the country. Second, the Croatian version of community policing is envisioned as a thorough and extensive reform incorporating the key elements of community policing. Third, although the philosophy of community policing is developed at the national level, the application of the community policing strategy happens at the local level. Fourth, community policing is a specialised assignment, limited to about 700 specially trained police officers nationwide, and, consequently, police officers who work in community policing can be easily identified. Relying on the police integrity survey data collected in Croatia, we studied the nature of the relation between one of the elements of police integrity (perceptions of offence seriousness) and the experience in community policing (working as a community policing officer).

2 Community Policing in Croatia

Although the Croatian police were established in the early 1990s, the process of democratisation was hampered by the war in the early 1990s and comprehensive reforms were initiated only in the late 1990s. The Police Law (Zakon o policiji, 2000) established critical conditions for the introduction of community policing. In particular, the Police Law stepped away from the view that the police are the only entity responsible for crime control and safety in the community and encouraged police-public cooperation in the pursuit of safety, as well as cooperation between the police and other institutions or organisations. Community policing was officially introduced in 2003 (Cajner Mraović, Faber, & Volarević, 2003). Based on the

four dimensions of community policing (Cordner, 2014), Croatian was envisioned as “a practical approach toward the problems in the society that assumes a cooperation between the police, social institutions, non-governmental institutions, and citizens in the resolution of these problems” (Cajner Mraović et al., 2003: 11). Cajner Mraović and colleagues (2003) argued that the success of community policing necessitated a fulfillment of six projects: 1) reform of the uniformed police; 2) enhancement of crime prevention; 3) organization of community prevention; 4) reform of public relations; 5) reform of the police education system; and 6) internal democratization of the police.

The implementation of community policing required system-wide changes. As part of the reform of the uniformed police, the new assignments “contact police officers” and “police officers for prevention” were established in 2003, and contact areas carved out (Faber & Cajner Mraović, 2003). Contact police officers are assigned to their contact areas permanently, and are expected to develop cooperative partnerships with the community. About 700 police officers were selected for these assignments and over time, about 1,000 officers received training to serve in these assignments. As part of the development of crime prevention, the police established the first preventive units in 2005 and developed prevention training. In response to the organisation of community prevention, in 2004, the police began to establish coordinating commissions, consisting of both citizens and the police, with the tasks of identifying community problems and outlining priorities in resolving them (Kovčo Vukadin, Borovec, & Ljubin Golub, 2013). Finally, in 2007, the reform of the public relations resulted in the professionalisation of the public relations office and its decentralisation (Borovec, 2011).

A 2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Republic of Croatia public opinion survey revealed that the citizens feel safe, expressed low fear of crime, and typically did not employ protective measures. Most of the respondents reported that they would be willing to help the police in the future and that, “it is necessary to establish a closer cooperation and relationship between the population and the police” for the purpose of maintaining order in the community (UNDP, 2009: 40). In 2015, Lobnikar, Cajner Mraović and Faber (2015) conducted a pilot study to evaluate community policing in Croatia and Slovenia, and although they did not assess the implementation of the six dimensions of community policing, they focused on the community-police relationship. The results showed that the majority of the surveyed Croatian citizens evaluated the quality of police-citizen contact as quite satisfactory, that they did not perceive crime and disorder as serious social problems, and that community cohesion was high (Lobnikar et al., 2015).

The 2008/2009 survey of the Croatian police (Kutnjak Ivković, 2009) revealed that virtually all of the respondents are familiar with community policing as a concept. Interestingly, their impressions about the level of support for community policing indicated that it was the strongest at the Ministry level (61% said that the support is strong), and weaker at the level of local subunits (police administrations, police stations; about 40% said that the support is strong).

3 Methodology

3.1 Questionnaire

The police integrity questionnaire (Klockars et al., 2006) included descriptions of 11 hypothetical scenarios, ranging from police corruption and use of excessive force, to planting of evidence and verbal abuse. After the respondents read the description of each scenario, they are asked to respond to the set of the same seven questions. These questions ask about

vide honest answers, the number of demographic questions was limited (i.e., length of the respondents' police experience, rank, assignment, and whether they were employed in a supervisory position), thereby minimizing the likelihood that the respondents could be individually identified on the basis of their collected demographic characteristics.

3.2 Sample

The questionnaire was administered to a representative sample of Croatian police in 2008/2009. The Croatian police are a hierarchical organisation, with the Ministry of the Interior at the top of the hierarchy, followed by 20 police administrations and 200 police stations. Based on several criteria (geographic size, population size, number of crimes known to the police, traffic patterns, and geographic location; see Ministry of the Interior, 2009), police administrations are divided into four categories (Zakon o policiji, 2000), and using these same criteria, police stations are classified into three categories (Zakon o policiji, 2000: Article 15).

Table 1: Sample Distribution

	Category 1 Police Stations	Category 2 Police Stations	Category 3 Police Stations	Total
Category I Police Administrations	113	108	63	284
Category II Police Administrations	118	51	43	212
Category III Police Administrations	167	86	86	339
Category IV Police Administrations	N/A	64	46	110
Total	398	309	238	945

police officers' knowledge of official rules, their opinions about the seriousness of the behaviour described in the scenario, their views about the appropriate and expected discipline, and their willingness to report such behaviour. In this paper, we analyse questions about misconduct seriousness. The version of the questionnaire used in Croatia contained two questions about community policing. The first asked respondents whether they have worked as contact police officers. The second question inquired about the strength of their support for community policing. The last part of the questionnaire contained a few demographic questions, and to maximize the likelihood that the respondents would pro-

The representative stratified sample represents both four categories of police administrations and three categories of police stations.⁴ Two stations were picked at random from each of the 11 cells created by cross-multiplying 4 categories of police administrations by 3 categories of police stations. The representative sample consists of 945 officers (Table 1), with 88% responding. Because of the small number of community-policing officers in each police station (1–2 per stati-

⁴ Specialised police stations, such as the traffic police, border police, maritime, and airport, are excluded from the sample because their tasks differ substantially from traditional police work.

on), we have surveyed an additional 197 community–policing officers from the same police administrations. Overall, our sample includes 329 police officers who claim that they have worked as community–policing officers, or about one-half of the total number of community–police officers in the country.

The overwhelming majority of the officers in our sample are experienced (75% had at least 10 years of experience), non-supervisors (86%), and male (88.1%), and are assigned primarily to patrol (33%), investigative units (14.5%), and community policing (24.5%). The overwhelming majority (85%) said that they answered truthfully while filling out the questionnaire, while 7.6% said that they lied and 7.5% did not answer the question. Only those answers by the respondents who reported answering honestly were included in the further analyses.

4 Results

Bivariate analyses (Table 2) revealed that the differences in the evaluations of misconduct seriousness between respondents employed as contact police officers and respondents employed in other assignments were small. They were typically below 10%, and many times even below 5% (Table 2). In only two scenarios – Scenario 2 (Fail to Arrest Friend with Warrant) and Scenario 3 (Theft of Knife from Crime Scene) – evaluated as the most serious (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015), the differences between the respondents employed as contact police officers and the respondents employed in other assignments were statistically significant (Table 2), with the respondents in community policing showing attitudes more congruent with higher levels of integrity.

To further explore the influence of community policing on the perceptions of seriousness, we performed multivariate analyses on the respondents' perceptions of seriousness (Table 3). Whether they worked as contact police officers was relevant in three scenarios (Scenario 2: Fail to Arrest Friend with Warrant; Scenario 8: Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident; Scenario 11: Sgt. Fails to Halt Beating) and, in two of these, those who reported working as contact police officers had lower odds of evaluating behavior as serious than those who did not work as contact police officers (Table 3). Our second measure of community policing – the strength of their support for community policing – was statistically significant in only one scenario (Scenario 11: Sgt. Fails to Halt Beating). In that scenario, the respondents who reported working as contact police officers had higher odds of recognising the behaviour as serious than those who did not work as contact police officers. This difference was also marginally significant in four additional scenarios (Table 3) and in all four, the respondents who reported working as contact police

officers had higher odds of recognising the behaviour as serious than the respondents employed in other assignments.

By far the most consistent predictor of the respondents' assessments of misconduct seriousness was whether they evaluated the behaviour as a violation of official rules (Table 3). In each of the 11 scenarios, the respondents who recognised the behaviour as rule-violating had much higher odds of saying that the behaviour is serious than the respondents who either said that the behaviour is not a violation of the official rules or that they did not know. Perceptions of seriousness were also strongly related to the respondents' estimates as to whether other police officers in the agency would report the behaviour (Table 3). In 9 out of 11 scenarios, the respondents who assumed that others would report had higher odds of evaluating the behaviour as serious than the respondents who estimated that others would not report. Views about expected discipline⁵ turned out not to be as strong predictors as assessments of rule-violations and estimates of others' reporting were. In particular, compared to the respondents who expected no discipline, the respondents who expected some discipline other than dismissal had higher odds of evaluating the behaviour as serious in only three scenarios (Table 3). On the other hand, respondents who expected dismissal had higher odds of evaluating the behaviour as serious in the majority of the scenarios (8 out of 9) than the respondents who expected no discipline (Table 3). Gender and supervisory position were not strong predictors of the respondent's assessment as to whether the misconduct is serious (Table 3). Gender was statistically significant in two out of 11 scenarios, with men having lower odds of evaluating the behaviour as serious than women. The supervisory position had an independent effect in only one scenario (Scenario 9: Auto-Body Shop 5% Kickback) and in that scenario, supervisors had higher odds of recognising the behaviour as serious than non-supervisors did. The odds of recognising the behaviour as serious were statistically higher for those who were more experienced ("6-15 years" of experience) than for those with the least experience ("up to 5 years") in three scenarios and marginally higher in three additional scenarios (Table 3). At the same time, the odds of recognising the behaviour as serious were statistically higher in nine scenarios and marginally higher in one more scenario (Table 3) for the most experienced respondents ("over 15 years") than for the least experienced respondents ("up to 5 years").

⁵ The distribution of answers to the questions about expected discipline was not uniform across all three answers ("none", "some discipline", and "dismissal"). As a consequence of a small number of respondents selecting a particular answer in some scenarios (Table 1), we could not compare the answers across all three categories of expected discipline ("none", "some discipline", and "dismissal") for all scenarios.

Table 2: Police Officer Perceptions of Seriousness by Community-Policing Experience

Scenario Number & Description	Worked as a COP		Did not work as a COP		Percent Difference (COP v. Non-COP)	Chi-Square	Phi
	Percent Serious	Percent Serious	Percent Serious	Percent Serious			
Scenario 1 – Free Meals, Gifts from Merchants ¹	49.0%	47.7%	49.0%	47.7%	1.3%	141	-.012
Scenario 2 – Fail to Arrest Friend with Warrant ²	89.5%	81.8%	89.5%	81.8%	7.7%	8.90**	-.096
Scenario 3 – Theft of Knife from Crime Scene ²	92.2%	84.4%	92.2%	84.4%	7.8%	10.79**	-.106
Scenario 4 – Unjustifiable Use of Deadly Force ²	71.0%	71.7%	71.0%	71.7%	-.7	.05	.007
Scenario 5 – Supervisor: Holiday Off for Errands ²	62.3%	59.7%	62.3%	59.7%	2.6	.06	-.024
Scenario 6 – Officer Strikes Prisoner Who Hurt Partner ¹	64.6%	60.2%	64.6%	60.2%	4.4	1.70	-.042
Scenario 7 – Verbal Abuse “Arrest Asshole Day” ¹	59.7%	63.0%	59.7%	63.0%	-3.3	.94	.031
Scenario 8 – Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident ¹	34.0%	38.7%	34.0%	38.7%	-4.7	1.90	.045
Scenario 9 – Auto-Body Shop 5 % Kickback ²	67.3%	65.6%	67.3%	65.6%	1.7	.29	-.017
Scenario 10 – False Report on Drug on Dealer ²	75.7%	70.2%	75.7%	70.2%	5.5	3.06	-.057
Scenario 11 – Sgt. Fails to Halt Beating ²	46.9%	45.4%	46.9%	45.4%	1.5	.18	-.014

¹ Seriousness was coded as “1,” “2,” and “3” as “not serious,” and “4” and “5” as “serious.”

² Seriousness was coded as “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4” as “not serious,” and “5” as “serious.”

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 3: Logistic Regression of Own Seriousness by COP Experience and Attitudes

	Scenario 1 (Gifts)			Scenario 6 (Strikes)			Scenario 7 (Verbal)			Scenario 8 (DUI)		
	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds
Worked as a COP ¹	-.166	.202	.847	-.142	.209	.868	-.191	.215	.826	-.465*	.211	.628
Support for COP ²	.325 ^m	.182	1.384	.150	.192	1.162	-.050	.198	.951	.310	.191	1.363
Length of service ³												
6–15 years	.282	.274	1.325	.321	.288	1.379	.529 ^m	.286	1.697	.106	.278	1.112
Over 15 years	.483 ^m	.281	1.621	.579*	.294	1.784	.699*	.293	2.012	.611*	.283	1.842
Gender ⁴	.148	.280	1.160	-.662*	.303	.516	-.614*	.307	.541	-.383	.288	.682
Supervisory position ⁵	.293	.223	1.341	.432 ^m	.231	1.540	.210	.242	1.233	.173	.226	1.189
Knowledge of rules ⁶	1.934***	.171	6.915	1.848***	.189	6.347	1.455***	.182	4.284	1.206***	.194	3.339
Others' reporting ⁷	.582***	.166	1.789	1.528***	.178	4.609	1.332***	.187	3.787	1.487***	.170	4.424
Expected discipline ⁸												
Some discipline	.014	.205	1.014	.651**	.249	1.918	1.143***	.233	3.136	.771**	.274	2.162
Dismissal	.138	.334	1.148							1.513**	.502	4.540
Constant	-2.102	.3338		-2.101	.366		-1.774	.356		-2.676	.386	
Model Nagelkerke R Squared		.317			.411			.391			.356	
	Scenario 2 (Warrant)			Scenario 3 (Theft)			Scenario 4 (Deadly F.)			Scenario 5 (Supervisor)		
	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds	B	s.e.	Odds
Worked as a COP ¹	.674*	.298	1.961	.391	.309	1.478	-.356	.219	.700	.049	.198	1.051
Support for COP ²	-.074	.239	.929	.477 ^m	.258	1.612	.343 ^m	.199	1.409	.302 ^m	.177	1.353
Length of service ³												
6–15 years	.536 ^m	.285	1.709	.286	.305	1.332	.005	.285	1.005	.521*	.250	1.684
Over 15 years	1.259***	.312	3.521	.994**	.337	2.702	-.011	.290	.989	.846**	.258	2.331
Gender ⁴	.125	.319	1.134	-.676 ^m	.372	.509	-.035	.297	.966	-.068	.263	.934
Supervisory position ⁵	.661 ^m	.349	1.937	.291	.351	1.337	-.063	.247	.939	.326	.218	1.385
Knowledge of rules ⁶	1.604***	.325	4.975	2.031***	.374	7.622	1.038***	.224	2.823	1.336***	.165	3.803

	Scenario 9 (Kickback)		Scenario 10 (Report)		Scenario 11 (Watching)								
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.							
Others' reporting ⁷	.408 ^m	.247	1.504	.286	.268	1.331	.880**	.253	2.411	.751***	.163	2.120	
Expected discipline ⁸													
Some discipline							.213	.368	1.238	-.154	.178	.858	
Dismissal	1.074***	.260	2.928	1.170***	.248	3.162223	1.270**	.378	3.559	1.278*	.642	3.589	
Constant	-1.332	.448		-.903	.494		-1.424	.446		-1.403	.311		
Model Nagelkerke R Squared	.184						.201		.239				
	Scenario 9 (Kickback)		Scenario 10 (Report)		Scenario 11 (Watching)								
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	Odds
Worked as a COP ¹	-.133	.220	-.011	.229	-.011	.229	.989	.205	-.484*	.205	.616		
Support for COP ²	.284	.199	.326	.202	.326	.202	1.385	.187	.577**	.187	1.780		
Length of service ³													
6-15 years	.941**	.271	.528 ^m	.280	.528 ^m	.280	1.695	.280	.553*	.280	1.739		
Over 15 years	1.204***	.279	.774**	.290	.774**	.290	2.168	.287	1.080***	.287	2.945		
Gender ⁴	-.186	.291	-.272	.309	-.272	.309	.762	.288	-.406	.288	.667		
Supervisory position ⁵	.775**	.272	.097	.251	.097	.251	1.102	.221	-.075	.221	.928		
Knowledge of rules ⁶	1.968***	.227	2.144***	.261	2.144***	.261	8.535	.243	1.768***	.243	5.859		
Others' reporting ⁷	.447*	.187	1.170***	.197	1.170***	.197	3.222	.172	1.095***	.172	2.990		
Expected discipline ⁸													
Some discipline	.246	.293	-.176	.391	-.176	.391	.838	.347	.661 ^m	.347	1.937		
Dismissal	1.577***	.356	.901*	.436	.901*	.436	2.461	.408	1.587***	.408	4.890		
Constant	-2.598	.408	-2.291	.450	-2.291	.450	-3.485	.443	-3.485	.443			
Model Nagelkerke R Squared	.356						.338		.340				

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; ^m $p < .10$

¹ Reference category = "no"; ² Reference category = "neutral/weak";

³ Reference category = "0 to 5 years"; ⁴ Reference category = "female";

⁵ Reference category = "non-supervisors"; ⁶ Reference category = "no/don't know";

⁷ Reference category = "would not report"; ⁸ Reference category = "no discipline" (in some scenarios we had to drop the category "no discipline" because of the small number of respondents who selected it and replace the reference category with "some discipline")

5 Conclusion

When community policing was introduced in Croatia in 2003, it was envisioned as a broad-sweeping reform of the Croatian police. The design of the proposed community policing programs targeted all four dimensions of community policing, from the philosophical dimension to the organisational dimension (Cajner Mraović et al., 2003). However, no independent study to date has systematically assessed how well these dimensions have been implemented and what effect they have had on the police-community relations.

Our results indicate that, when compared to the more traditional assignments, working as a contact police officer makes little difference concerning perceptions of misconduct seriousness. Similarly, the strength of support for community policing did not yield large differences in their evaluations of misconduct seriousness. There are several plausible explanations for the lack of community policing effect.

First, although the Ministry claims to screen and train officers assigned as contact police officers, the implementation of these steps may not have been effective. Unfortunately, there has been no independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the screening process and training. As attention has been moving away from community policing and the enthusiasm for it has started to wane over the years, it is quite possible that both the currently operating screening mechanism and training do not result in producing highly effective community police officers.

Second, contact police officers could have learned the basics of community policing during training, but never actually have internalised the program and applied it in their everyday activities. Future studies could explore not only how well the contact police officers know the basics of community policing, but also the extent to which the implementation of the basic principles takes place in practice.

Third, community policing was introduced as a system-wide reform, with the idea that all police officers should be familiar with it. Although contact police officers should have received additional training in community policing and thus should have been ahead of other officers in their understanding, if the quality of the training was insufficient or if they had not truly internalized community policing, their level of familiarity with community policing would not soar above the level of other police officers.

Fourth, we have measured participation in community policing through respondents' self-determined statements that they worked as contact police officers. Although we have

no reason to believe that the surveyed police officers had any motivation to hide their assignments, future research could compare their self-determination with their actual classification. Similarly, we have measured the strength of their support for community policing through their self-expressed support. Future research could include questions measuring their knowledge of the key facts of community policing and its application.

Fifth, it is possible that perceptions of offence seriousness were not as affected by the experience in community policing as they were affected by various other organisational factors, such as organisational rules, discipline harshness, and the code of silence. Indeed, our results show that for every scenario, knowledge of official rules was the most powerful predictor of misconduct seriousness assessment. Similarly, expected discipline harshness and the perception that the code of silence would not cover the behaviour, were strong predictors of the evaluations of misconduct seriousness in almost all scenarios.

Sixth, we have used perceptions of misconduct seriousness to measure police integrity. While prior research (e.g., Klockars et al., 2006) has indicated that evaluations of seriousness were strongly correlated with other measures of police integrity (e.g., knowledge of official rules, expected discipline, willingness to report misconduct), there is a possibility that we did not find large differences in part because these officers, both contact police officers and police officers in other assignments, are part of the same organization and same police culture. In fact, they may share the values consistent with the underlying hierarchy of misconduct seriousness, uncovered by extant research (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015).

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Ali policijsko delo v skupnosti vpliva na integriteto policistov?

Dr. Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, redna profesorica, Šola za kazensko pravosodje, Michigan State University, ZDA.
E-pošta: kutnjak@msu.edu

Dr. Irena Cajner Mraović, izredna profesorica, Center za hrvaške študije Univerze v Zagrebu, Hrvaška.
E-pošta: icajner@hrstud.hr

Krunoslav Borovec, pomočnik generalnega direktorja policije – načelnik uprave policije,
Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve, Hrvaška. E-pošta: kborovec@hrstud.hr

V prispevku se osredotočamo na predhodno še neraziskano problematiko, narave odnosa med integriteto policije in policijskim delom v skupnosti. V stratificiran reprezentativni vzorec smo zajeli 1.315 hrvaških policistov, ki so v sklopu študije o integriteti policije ocenjevali resnost neprimerne vedenja policije in primerne oziroma pričakovane disciplinske postopke zoper neprimerno vedenje ter poročali o pripravljenosti za prijavo tovrstnega vedenja. Hkrati so anketiranci podali svoje mnenje o policijskem delu v skupnosti. Približno četrtina anketirancev je bila zaposlenih na področju policijskega dela v skupnosti, medtem ko so drugi opravljali bolj tradicionalne policijske naloge. Oblikovani multivariatni modeli o resnosti neprimerne vedenja policistov so pokazali, da se naloge policistov – tako tiste, ki se povezujejo s policijskim delom v skupnosti, kot tudi bolj tradicionalne policijske naloge, redko povezujejo z njihovo stopnjo integritete. Nadalje ni bila ugotovljena pomembna poveza med podporo policistov policijskemu delu v skupnosti in njihovimi ocenami o resnosti neprimerne vedenja policistov. Po drugi strani pa je priznavanje vedenja, ki je v nasprotju s pravili, ob predpostavki, da bi drugi policisti prijavili tovrstno vedenje, za katero je pričakovan disciplinski ukrep odpoved, povečalo verjetnost, da bodo policisti priznavali resnost tovrstnega vedenja. Nadalje spol in nadzorni status nista vplivala na ocene resnosti neprimerne vedenja, medtem ko je delovna doba v policiji vplivala na ocene resnosti neprimerne vedenja.

Ključne besede: policija, integriteta, neprimerno vedenje, policijsko delo v skupnosti, tranzicija, Hrvaška

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