Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo / Ljubljana 69 / 2018 / 4, 245–256

Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks: A Mixed Methodological Research into the Views of Criminal Justice and Non-Criminal Justice Professionals[1]

Vincenzo Ruggiero[2]

This paper provides an analytical summary of the findings of a research project into the activities, the causes of, and responses to, organized crime and terrorism. Based on the views of front-line practitioners such as social workers, teachers, law enforcers and other experts, the paper examines their needs, interpretations, uncertainties and perspectives. It then compares these views with those emerging from previous analyses and research, highlighting the assonances and dissonances that typically crowd these areas of investigation.

Keywords: organized crime, terrorist networks, drivers, institutional responses, prevention

UDC: 343.341:343.3

1 Introduction

Practitioners dealing with organized crime and terrorist networks tend to develop varying views around the activities and causes leading individuals to join such networks. They also differ in how they evaluate the effectiveness of responses to these phenomena, and in a reflective fashion the adequacy of the professional setting in which they operate. Causation aspects have been addressed by many criminological schools of thought, including positivism, functionalism, labelling, strain, conflict, and control theory. These theories attempt to identify the drivers of both phenomena while hypothesizing the pathways of offenders into organized criminality and terrorist activities. The practitioners who acted as informants in this research drew on their own direct experience in dealing with both, highlighting the constraints, difficulties and misunderstandings hampering their routine work. They often expressed views that find an echo in the criminological literature. As responses to organized crime and terrorism are inevitably linked to their perceived causes, informants in this research project also expressed views on the efficacy of existing legislation and the structural makeup of the organizations in which they worked. This paper examines such views in light of analyses and previous research conducted into organized crime and terrorism.

[1] Funding has been received from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement N. 700688.

[2] Vincenzo Ruggiero, Ph.D., Professor, Law School, Middlesex University, UK. E-mail: v.ruggiero@mdx.ac.uk

2 Methodology

Using a mixed methodology that includes a quantitative empirical framework with qualitative inputs from interviews, focus groups and workshops, this research canvassed the views of key commentators in the field. The respondents were selected from law enforcement agencies, policy makers, the academic community, practitioners and other stakeholders in the area of prevention of organized crime and terrorism. A quantitative survey was conducted to engage front-line practitioners and professionals. Focus groups were then carried out with practitioner organizations working as law enforcement agents. Finally, workshops were conducted with solution providers, professionals and experts in the field of security.

In more detail, interviews were held with informants based in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. On the institutional EU-level, 6 interviews with relevant experts were carried out. A few more interviews (3) were conducted with researchers established in the surveyed countries, but whose expertise was not country-focused; they were experts on terrorism and organized crime in Europe in general. Among the interviewees, researchers constituted the highest number of responders (53 interviews, 47.3%), followed by practitioners (24 interviews, 21.4%), and policy-makers (13 interviews, 11.6%). These latter served at the national level (members of national parliaments), while a few of them operated at the local or international level. Responders labelled as practitioners often decided to hide their affiliation and name. Those who

stated their affiliation had a variety of tasks: the sample included police officers, people working for NGOs, working in prisons, working on counter-terrorism or organized crime within administrations, as well as social workers working on prevention. Some responders were categorized with mixed-connotation labels (22 interviews, 19.6%): these responders were experts in multiple fields of activities, thereby allowing interviewers to gain interesting insights into multifaceted perspectives on issues related to organized crime and/or terrorist networks.

An online survey gathered data on the practices and views of first-line professionals, who were directly or indirectly helping to address the causes or effects associated with terrorism and/or organized crime. Data collection for the survey took place from May 24 to September 16, 2017 by using the Qualtrics Online Survey tool. This survey targeted a niche pool of respondents rather than the general population, which explains the sample size of 519. Regarding the demographics, more than 65% of the respondents were male, and a majority was between 30 to 40 years old. The survey covered a total of 23 countries, 15 different professions that fall into the category of first-line-practitioners, and 12 different areas of work within these professions. The findings were generated via the use of SPSS software.

Eleven focus groups were organized in 8 countries across the European Union. The focus groups engaged 107 law enforcement agents and front-line practitioner organizations working on organized crime or terrorist networks. Finally, workshops were organized with solution providers, professionals and experts in the field of security. The workshops took place in Darmstadt, Reggio Calabria, Barcelona and Brussels, involving some forty professionals. Each workshop aimed to highlight current challenges, available solutions as well as possible societal and ethical issues.

3 Findings

3.1 Organized Crime Activities

There was a widely shared sense that knowledge of the organized crime and terrorist phenomena is insufficient. This lack of knowledge was highlighted in the survey as well as in the qualitative research based on workshops, focus groups and interviews. Among the experts interviewed the point was made that more cooperation between researchers and practitioners, along with less emotional attitudes on the part of public bodies, would contribute significantly to a better understanding of both phenomena. Those interviewed also stressed the importance of collaborating with external experts, particularly in the relatively 'unknown' area of cybercrime. Interviews, moreover, brought to the fore the need for an international platform for the exchange of information. The majority of respondents (60%), however, mentioned drug production/distribution and cybercrime, along with the smuggling of people, as the main activities of organized crime. In their view, these require more effective prevention or response policies and strategies. Only in a minority of national contexts was it felt that the normal activities of organized crime include forays into the licit world thanks to the partnership with, and the support or tolerance of, official political representatives and/or legitimate entrepreneurs.

Two main points need to be highlighted here. First, the research process led to no distinction being made between professional and organized crime. The former is characterized by a horizontal structure in which agents operate as peers, planning schemes together, executing them, and sharing proceeds. By contrast, the latter implies a distinction between planning and execution, a wage relationship between a patron and an agent, and a degree of invisibility: agents may ignore the motivations and the very identity of those recruiting them (Arlacchi, 1994; Armao, 2000; Dino, 2008; Ruggiero, 2000). The activities mentioned by our informants, to be sure, may be carried out by both professional and organized criminals, but the emphasis was placed only on the latter. Second, the activities conducted by organized crime in the official arena, which concerned only a few of the experts interviewed, were neglected by the majority of informants contacted through the quantitative as well as the qualitative research processes.

Previous research has established that organized criminal groups which gain access to the legitimate economy and the political apparatus complete the evolution hypothesized by Peterson (1991), whereby this type of crime traverses a number of successive stages: a predatory, a parasitic, and finally a symbiotic stage. While some groups may fail to undergo a similar evolution, thus stagnating in conventional criminal markets, others may instead succeed, thereby straddling legality and illegality in their operations.

By focusing on conventional criminal activities, many of our respondents overlooked the instances in which organized crime invests into the official economy, engages in the delivery of services, and becomes involved in the formation of partnerships with legitimate actors. Criminal networks, which facilitate such non-conventional activities, were also neglected (Dino & Ruggiero, 2012; Ruggiero, 2017). In brief, informants focused their attention mainly on conventional criminal activities, namely organized groups that remain confined to illicit markets.

3.2 Organized Crime Drivers

'Being raised in a criminal environment' scored very high among our respondents (66%), whereas 'Discriminatory police tactics against certain groups and individuals' scored very low (7%). Families were regarded as part of such a criminal environment. Some participants in the focus groups claimed that legal restrictions on police work was a problem for those involved in the investigation of human smuggling, a problem also encountered in the identification of criminals due to private data protection laws. The analysis of our quantitative data also shows that joining organized crime networks was perceived to be less due to mental difficulties and instability than with lack of opportunities (45%). It is interesting to locate the responses received in our survey with the traditional and contemporary debate around the causes of organized crime.

From the perspective of the Positivist School of criminology, the variable 'tradition' plays a crucial role (Lombroso, 1971). 'A criminal environment', and the 'families' within it, return in subsequent interpretations in the form of 'backwardness' or 'archaism'. These are analyses that address organized crime from a 'cultural' perspective (among the most celebrated are Hess, 1973 and Hobsbawm, 1971). Belonging to the same cluster are contributions focusing on the perpetuation of organized forms of criminality, which is said to derive from the lack of popular stigma attached to those involved. Subcultural theorists, for instance, would argue that members of criminal organizations are not regarded as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe, nor are they associated with immorality or elicit contempt (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955). Our respondents, by emphasizing the 'learning process' implied in being 'raised in a criminal environment', located their views in the tradition of subcultural theories.

Echoing strain theory, the majority of participants in the online survey singled out 'lack of opportunities' as a causation variable. Merton's (1968) deviant adaptation of the 'innovative' type comes to mind, namely a solution adopted by those who pursue the officially sanctioned goals of money and success through alternative illicit means. The quantitative parts of the research, on the other hand, failed to provide the nuanced descriptions found in the 'social disorganization' tradition, that is to say descriptions of organized crime as micro-societies characterized by a surrogate social order (Downes & Rock, 1988; Landesco, 1969; Shaw, 1930; Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943). While police discrimination against certain individuals and groups was deemed irrelevant by our respondents, some classical literature focuses instead on the participation of the police themselves in organized criminality (Landesco, 1969). Finally, the variable 'low self-control' (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) did emerge in interviews and workshops, but notions of organized crime as service provider in contexts characterized by lack of trust was not (Gambetta, 1992; McIntosh, 1975; Varese, 2010, 2017).

3.3 Measures against Organized Crime

Respondents mainly opted for the creation of special police/law enforcement units (49%) and discarded the idea that new drug legislation would have an effect on the fight against organized crime (22%). Little attention was devoted to the potential of labor market reform and improved welfare provision (20%). The analysis of our quantitative data reveals that the policing and criminal justice group of our informants did not necessarily see more aggressive tactics as effective prevention tools. Participants in focus groups stressed the importance of integrating young people and empowering them, namely making them able to express their opinions and reach independent decisions. More involvement of civil society was advocated, along with more material resources and training for law enforcers and investigators. Interviews with experts revealed unsatisfactory feelings around the problem of agency cooperation and transnational coordination of responses. They also emphasized how institutional responses are often driven by emergency situations and determined by the search for political consensus. Some interviewees stressed the importance, in the fight against organized crime, of establishing proper protection for whistleblowers. The analysis of quantitative data shows a prevalence of non-criminal justice professionals favoring human and social approaches to reduce the incidence of organized crime (44%). The analysis also reveals that aims and objectives in combating this type of crime are shared across occupational roles. Some law enforcers involved in focus groups lamented the inadequacy of cybercrime units and the need to liaise with the private sector, particularly commercial banks. Respondents involved in workshops stressed the need for strong coordination, communication and alignment of national and international laws that regulate the field of cyber-security. Interviewees pointed out the need for more strategic, and comprehensive prevention measures, but also for techniques capable of evaluating the effectiveness of such measures.

For further analysis, and as mentioned in the introduction, data were manipulated to collapse those participants working in criminal justice related fields (CJ professionals) and those working in other domains such as education and youth work (non-CJ professionals). Comparing criminal justice professionals to non-criminal justice professionals, we see a substantial difference in where they believe reductions in criminality could occur, in Table 1.

Table 1: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions for crime reduction across professional types

Variables	CJ professionals % (n)	Non-CJ professionals % (n)	Significance
Social welfare	28 (63)	40 (36)	4.08*
Job creation	48 (61)	53 (87)	0.81, NS
Increased policing	28 (33)	31 (47)	0.33, NS
Sentence enhancement	34 (41)	38 (60)	0.60, NS
Increased therapy	24 (30)	35 (55)	4.0*

* Denotes significant association at the $p < 0.05$ level. The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

Two findings are worthy of attention. First, respondents within both groups did not differ in how they saw job creation and the two criminal justice approaches reducing organized criminality (increased policing and sentence enhancement). Surprisingly, the policing and criminal justice group did not necessarily see harder tactics working in prevention and reduction. Interestingly, more human-centered approaches such as a social welfare and economic approach to programs were favored, as well as a more tailored approach to accessing mental health and psychological services, with the non-criminal justice professionals predicting higher levels of moderate to high reductions if these approaches were to be taken. Further research would need to be undertaken to understand the specific connections and associations at play here. If sample sizes per profession were larger, additional research could look more closely at these finite differences in opinion. Table 2 below explores an additional set of actions perceived as effective to reduce organized criminality.

Table 2 above shows that there was no difference between the opinions of individuals within each professional category regarding the effects of each action on curbing/reducing organized criminality. As is evident, the percentages of each subsample, with the exception of the 'creation of special policing units', were all quite low, meaning that the majority of all participants, regardless of what they believed to be appropriate in tackling organized crime, did not think that these factors will have a great influence on crime reduction. A positive message to take away from this analysis is, again, the similar views of participants regardless of their community standing. As a consequence, one would advocate for multidisciplinary partnership in tackling the issue of organized crime for bringing in a range of expertise (not just criminal justice). But let us provide a general backdrop against which the responses received might be better understood.

Table 2: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across reducing organized criminality

Variables	CJ professionals % (n)	Non-CJ professionals % (n)	Significance
Increased rehabilitation	33 (41)	38 (62)	0.77, NS
Special units	51 (63)	49 (80)	0.17, NS
Investments schools	37 (46)	43 (67)	0.88, NS
Legalize prostitution	18 (19)	18 (24)	0.02, NS
Legalize drugs	20 (31)	27 (36)	0.24, NS
Community policing	40 (50)	42 (67)	0.05, NS

* The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

3.4 Backdrop

Informants, in sum, advocated a mixture of measures reflecting both a social and a technical character. Educational programs aimed at spreading civic awareness were prioritized, as were projects promoting social inclusion. In line with anti-drug policies already operational across Europe, the majority of respondents called for tackling demand through informative public health campaigns supplied through international agency cooperation. Skepticism about the introduction of new legislation led to neglecting the potential effect of decriminalizing the use of some drugs. As already mentioned, little interest was also shown in social prevention based around labor market reform and improved welfare provision. By contrast, research conducted by institutional agencies (Europol, 2011) and independent investigators alike (Dino, 2016; Hobbs, 2013) depicts organized crime as an 'employer' attracting individuals who find no suitable occupation in the official labor market. With legitimate occupations being increasingly characterized by precarious conditions and rather poor wages, organized crime may well appear as a more appealing labor recruiter. Social prevention, in this respect, should make legitimate work competitive, in ethical and material terms alike.

Prioritizing, as most informants did, the use of special tools and units appears to be consistent with the common strategies already used by European governments, which consist of 'dismantling criminal organizations by dismantling their leadership structures in order to fragment them into minor and more manageable groups' (Ferreira, 2016: 43). Measures have included a mixture of undercover operations, raids, privacy-piercing approaches, and, increasingly, collaboration with intelligence services and international policing agencies. Some observers judged such strategies to be ineffective, particularly in developed countries, while in developing countries they risk, it is feared, to 'intensify pre-existing conflicts, turf wars, and generate smaller, less predictable and more violent groups fighting fiercely for smaller turfs' (Ferreira, 2016: 43).

In brief, the old dilemma whether monopolistic organized crime causes more harm than disorganized crime remains unsolved (Andreano & Siegfried, 1980). For this reason, some academic researchers would suggest that efforts to eradicate organized crime should rely less on conventional crime-control activities than on the alteration of the incentive structures in place in the economic and the political spheres (Milhaupt & West, 2000). Hence the broad structural suggestions emanating from the European Parliament (2016) include: increasing public finding for schemes in underdeveloped regions, implementing economic growth strategies, enforcing and strengthening the regulations governing national and international financial institutions, prosecuting money-laundering enablers, developing international schemes of asset recovery, and harmonizing standards for confiscation. It has to be noted that while informants in this research also stressed the importance of patrimonial measures, they failed to appreciate the role that the allocation of funds to problematic regions could play. In fact, they called for more funds, resources and training to be allocated to law enforcers rather than to society at large.

As mentioned above, informants were perplexed about the way in which the effectiveness of strategies and measures can be assessed. Their perplexity may derive from the fact that strategies and measures mainly target closed enclaves of socially and culturally homogenous individuals, in other words they confine their intervention to conventional criminal activities, or the underworld, while overlooking the connections this establishes with the overworld. As already noted, only in reference to specific national contexts (for instance, Bulgaria), was the unwillingness of government to sever the links between organized crime and the official world pointed out.

It is difficult to explain the unsatisfactory feelings expressed by informants concerning the problem of agency cooperation and transnational coordination of responses. The Maastricht Treaty includes articles concerning police cooperation and addresses the growth of organized crime as a product of the process of integration. First regarded as an issue to be tackled excludively under the Third Pillar (the intergovernmental pillar), the fight against organized crime gave rise to police and judicial cooperation and a new systems and procedures to improve the timely sharing of information. In 1990, member states stipulated the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, which was turned by the Council into a directive in 1991. Under that directive, states were forced to implement legislation against money laundering, 'but also to ensure that their financial institutions would register and report unusual and suspect transactions to the competent authorities (Fijnaut, 2015: 574).

Cooperation among member states stepped up in the aftermath of the assassination of Palermo investigative judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, and resulted in the establishment of Europol in 1995. European concerns around organized crime were also intensified by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the threat of new forms of criminal activity emanating from its former satellite states in Eastern Europe (Dunn, 1996). An Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime was produced in 1997 under the banner of the Treaty of Amsterdam, instructing member states to integrate prevention, investigation and prosecution and harmonize their

relevant legislation. In a cumulative process, policies and strategies were devised under the successive presidencies of the European Council, and in 1999 Eurojust was created, constituting a multinational European team of national prosecutors and police officers. A European Police College was funded, while a Financial Intelligence Unit tasked with information sharing about money laundering was set up (Fijnaut, 2015). In brief, the unsatisfactory feelings conveyed by informants may testify to the difficulties member states encounter when they attempt to translate general principles and guidelines (or even instructions) into routine practical action. Many opined that difficulties, may derive from their commonly shared perception that institutional responses are often driven by emergency situations and determined by the search for political consensus.

As for the technical measures advocated, increasing the quality of equipment and training of police forces scored high (about 40%). Support was given to the European Parliament suggestions to strengthen the regulations governing the activities of financial institutions and the prosecution of money-laundering enablers (see Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3). But along with the importance of patrimonial measures, the crucial role of special units for the fight of organized crime seemed to be highly prioritized. Only in reference to specific national contexts (for instance, Bulgaria), was the unwillingness of government to sever the links between organized crime and the official world pointed out.

3.5 Terrorist Activities

In general terms, also in the area of terrorism more cooperation between researchers and practitioners was deemed necessary for gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon. The highest number and proportion of respondents stressed that propaganda and recruitment require more effective prevention (12%). In the focus groups, however, it was argued that common definitions of violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism are needed, and that the emotional public reaction to such phenomena hampers their genuine understanding. The analysis of our multi-source data shows a generalized concern among respondents about terrorism financing and cyber terrorism (10%). Some interviewees lamented that existing expertise in this area is underused by official agencies. One important finding was that the invasion of countries was not deemed to stop terrorism, but rather encourage it. It is interesting to compare this concern with research findings on this specific issue and other aspects of terrorism.

Working closely with Islamic fundamentalists, Sageman (2017) gained an intimate understanding of how propaganda dissemination and recruitment take place. He observed the development of networks transforming socially isolated individuals into warriors, and noted that affiliation is normally a bottom-up process, with young people volunteering to join the organization. Friendship and kinship bonds emerged as key factors in shaping the networks involved. In brief, propaganda and recruitment, the concerns of our informants, occur through micro-social dynamics, which are little known to law enforcement and, therefore, can hardly be influenced by outsiders.

The necessity to clarify definitions is perceived in the existing literature as it was by the majority of our respondents. However, the emotional public reaction to terrorism, regarded by respondents as detrimental, seems to be perfectly understandable when targeting preferences are examined. Research conducted on this aspect of the problem reveals that soft targets are 'dominant and increasing, while particularly well-protected targets are almost totally avoided' (Hemmingby, 2017: 25). In other words, the general public is more exposed than high-ranking individuals or highly symbolic buildings or premises such as parliaments, governmental institutions or business headquarters.

The point was made by some informants (12%) that the invasion of a country may be followed by organized violent resistance, and that invasions may destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian attacks. The example of Libya was referred to in this regard (Ismael & Ismael, 2013), while research suggests that over thirty per cent of the founders of ISIS were former members of the Ba'athist secret services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge by responding to the invasion of their country with unpredictable indiscriminate attacks (Gerges, 2015; Lynch, 2015).

3.6 Terrorist Drivers

In the opinion of the majority of respondents (60%), individuals join terrorist networks because they are raised in a culture that promotes extreme ideological views. Psychological-personality disorders, in their view, have a moderate influence as well (42%). In the focus groups some participants underlined the exclusion of young people joining terrorist networks and their search for stability when joining them. The stress was also on vulnerability and lack of guidance and security on the part of families. A strong association between economic exclusion, isolation and alienation was found in our data analysis (53%), which also showed the respondents' stress on the influence of malevolent leadership figures (52%).

Cultures promoting extreme ideological views have been studied by scholars who have attempted to find in sacred texts the cause of contemporary terrorism (Adonis, 2016; Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016). Challenging causations derived from foundational texts, other scholars have underlined how the Quran is replete with suggestions around dialogue, peace and the development of harmonious interfaith relationships (Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Finally, the argument has been made that it is not Islam, but religion in general has always played a role in war and terrorist violence, even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Hassner, 2016; Sacks, 2015).

Research into psychological factors has linked terrorism with collective animosity against injustice and power. The final step on a narrowing staircase (Moghaddam, 2005), the choice of terror is said to appeal to individuals who believe they have no voice in society and who express a 'significance quest' (Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009). One of the causes identified in the literature is the feeling of 'weakness, irrelevance, marginalization and subordination experienced by Muslim people', combined with the memory of the glorious past of a great transnational civilization (Toscano, 2016: 123). The 'reactionary utopia' of the Caliphate is explained in these terms, namely as the result of frustration determined by the gap between expectations and achievement. The frustration thesis seems to apply to both prevailing models of terrorism: 'the fanatic who is outside any appeal to rationality, and the calculating actor who lacks any capacity for human empathy' (McDonald, 2013: 11).

Research has also examined terrorism as a corollary of social exclusion; extremists are said to come from the poorest and most rundown parts of cities, where youth are raised in large housing estates and where trouble flares up periodically. Accounts illustrate the fractured lives of young second-generation migrants, their alienation, exclusion, family size, poverty and disrupted upbringings. Some traverse the pathways from home to care and from crime to prison, struggle within the education system, and display all the 'predictors of criminal behavior' (Walklate & Mythen, 2016: 337). However, 'It is erroneous to presume that material deprivation works in a simple and/or straightforward manner in relation to the propensity to commit violence' (Walklate & Mythen, 2016: 338). To claim that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of terrorism neglects the fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed by the United Nations as the poorest, least developed, most unjust and unequal. As Sen (2015: 165) has argued:

'The simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too crude, both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from universally observed, and because there are other social factors … Calcutta is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it so happens that it also has a very low crime rate'.

In sum, our respondents tended to overstress social and structural factors as causes of terrorism, although they also tended to highlight the 'search for stability' that encourages young people to join terrorist networks. Their views on cultures promoting violence find controversial treatment in some research, while findings in the psychological domain may suggest that more attention should be devoted to this area of investigation.

3.7 Measures to Decrease Terrorism

The majority of respondents thought that cross-border cooperation between police and intelligence agencies to facilitate monitoring, arrest and disruption would have the strongest effect (52%), and that military action abroad to target terrorist leaders and infrastructure has little to no effect. Pre-emptive intelligence was called for, mainly in interviews and workshops. Opinions collected in focus groups addressed the issue of legal documentation for young migrants who otherwise 'get lost in the system'. Newcomers, it was stressed, should receive appropriate support and guidance. Social workers, it was noted, needed to be properly trained in order to 'connect' with young people at risk. Often, their lack of religiosity was regarded as an obstacle preventing such connection. Other actors to be involved in the preventative process, it was remarked, include community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families. One problem raised during the course of interviews with experts was that preventative and other measures are commonly the result of mere public pressure. Preventative work should also take place in prison institutions, it was remarked. Interviews stressed, at the same time, that policy-making processes should be evidence-based and that a wider involvement of Muslim communities is necessary.

As in the previous section on organized crime, an analysis was undertaken to explore whether there were any significant differences between professional standing and belief of effect in reducing individual's involvement in terrorist activities. Table 3 speaks to each of these, and refers to the sample as a whole.

Table 3: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types

Variables	CJ professionals % (n)	Non-CJ professionals % (n)	Significance
Equipment	42 (25)	48 (41)	0.61, NS
Social welfare	21 (12)	43 (32)	6.48*
Job creation	33 (19)	36 (29)	0.06, NS
Increased policing	33 (20)	35 (27)	0.50, NS
Special police	53 (32)	49 (41)	0.21, NS
Increased therapy	34 (19)	33 (26)	0.02, NS

* Denotes significant association at the $p < 0.01$ level. The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

None of the statistical tests undertaken (exploring the difference in beliefs around the reduction of terrorist activities or participation) were significant, with the exception of 'social welfare' approaches. Here, non-CJ professionals were twice as likely to believe that such approaches could work. Do note, however, that regardless of this, most of each subsample were below a majority (with the exception of CJ professionals seeing a moderate to strong effect in the inclusion of special police or units). This may demonstrate reluctance in the existing methods to curb contemporary terrorism in Europe. Of note is also the fact that the non-CJ professionals saw significantly more than their CJ counterparts the importance of work by civil society and the third sector in dealing with violent extremism and terrorism. Table 4 provides additional information on potential actions that participants were queried on about reducing involvement in terrorist activities.

reduce the level of participation in terrorist activities. One significant result—military intervention abroad—demonstrates that non-CJ professionals are more likely (more than half the subsample) than their CJ counterparts to believe that this will have a weak effect. It is worth noting that more than half of the subsample overall saw cross-border cooperation as being an improvement and having an effect on reducing participation in terrorist activities (however, the difference between the two groups of professionals was non-significant). Let us interrogate research and other sources on these points.

Official agencies seem to share the view that cross-border coordination has a strong effect. In this respect, an Agenda on Security for the period 2015-2020 was set out by the European Commission, detailing the concrete tools to be used in joint anti-terrorist work (European Commission, 2015). Technical anti-terrorist preventative measures adopted within the EU

Table 4: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types

Variables	CJ professionals % (n)	Non-CJ professionals % (n)	Significance
Cross-border cooperation	62 (37)	53 (45)	1.09, NS
Improving community	32 (18)	33 (27)	0.03, NS
Border control	41 (24)	42 (34)	0.02, NS
Military intervention	37 (20)	51 (39)	2.60*
Community policing	47 (27)	43 (55)	0.21, NS
Reform education	36 (20)	31 (26)	0.44, NS

* Denotes significant association at the $p<0.05$ level. The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

As with the analysis undertaken in Table 3, the factors and actions investigated in the above table did not produce any significant results in terms of different views on how to

include the exchange of DNA data, which is also carried out in the fight against other forms of cross-border crime (Santos & Machado, 2016), along with the introduction of new coun-

ter-terrorism legislation in most member states. Glorification and incitement are now widely criminalized.

As for military intervention, most available literature oscillates between suggestions to deal with terrorism through the rule of law and deprecation for unnecessary military action. While EU citizens overwhelming believe that institutional action against terrorism and radicalization is insufficient (European Parliament, 2016), states reacting with pure military force are said to imitate the illusions and delusions of those groups or individuals they are trying to combat (English, 2016). The dangers of what is termed a 'forever war' are highlighted: 'Say the word "war" and the rule of law often implodes' (Rakoff, 2016: 80). This is the view, among others, of distinguished law experts, who find themselves in disagreement when the judiciary avoids scrutinizing anything 'embarrassing', such as from far-reaching surveillance, torture, or the use of drones (Fiss, 2016; Todorov, 2014). Equal controversy surrounds the use of 'disposition matrix' or 'kill lists' that spell out who has to be hit by a long-distance unmanned missile (Hayden, 2016).

In the UK, a study has examined the emotional impact of counter-terrorist strategies on Muslim communities, while several authors have focused on how such strategies increase fear and encourage suspicion and racism (Abbas & Awan, 2015; Ahmed, 2015; Mythen & Walklate, 2006). Finally, counter-terrorist wars have also been judged as serious obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid (Gill, 2016). It should be added that when there is a disconnect between the depiction of terrorist threat as presented by official agencies and the perception of large sectors of the public, responses to terror attacks fail to gain the support they would need to be successful (Smith et al., 2016). This disconnect is likely to widen, at least in the UK, after the publication of the Chilcot Report, showing the disastrous outcome of the institutional deceit leading to the invasion of Iraq (Chilcot, 2016; Wheatcroft, 2016).

Informants did not specify the type of pre-emptive intelligence measures they advocated, nor did they seem to be aware of the considerable controversies surrounding them. For instance, some schemes have been located within the 'precrime' strategies adopted in many western countries. These strategies are said to center state action on sheer suspicion, whereby individuals and groups are targeted without a specific charge being formulated. Anticipating risk, in this sense, tends to integrate national security into criminal justice, to the detriment of civil and political rights (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009). Anti-terrorism, from this perspective, is said to become a threat to democracy (Wolfendale, 2007; Zedner, 2000). It is difficult to determine whether this is one of the cases in which, according to respondents, measures were implemented as a response to public pressure. Scant attention is devoted to the importance, as underlined in interviews, of the religiosity of social workers, whereas some research findings are available on issues around prevention of radicalization in prison and in the financial arena, where terrorist organizations find resources to support their propaganda, attacks and the reproduction of their own networks (Hamm, 2007, 2013).

Examples of community involvement as proposed by informants are relatively common across Europe. For example, prevention is pursued through targeting families, both those affected by the radicalization of one or more of their members and those who feel the need to protect their offspring from the radicalization process. In the UK, FAST (Families Against Stress & Trauma) is one such initiative, engaged in making people aware of the risks of the Internet and exposure of young people to violent messages. Although more controversial, the 'Prevent' program, launched in the UK in 2003 as one of the four elements of CONTEST, the government's counter-terrorism strategy, is inspired by similar aims, mobilizing in particular teachers and lecturers in the detection of embryonic signs of radicalization.

'Agenfor Media' is also engaged in preventing radical escalation, and produces videos and printed documents for use in their work. These methods explain how to deal with vulnerable groups and individuals of the Muslim faith from an Islamic perspective. The area of radicalization in prisons and jails is also covered, while access to an informative social media channel is provided dealing with terrorists' wars and the muslim insurgents in several regions of the world. See its mission statement at: http://www.agenformedia.com/dossier/preventing-radical-escalations.

Community-led (or social media) initiatives also often take the form of testimonies and life stories of the individuals affected by radicalization. They aim to reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations to persons vulnerable to recruitments.

The 'Viennese Network Deradicalization and Prevention' is active in the Austrian capital, it and operates mostly in the field of education. The network elaborates and assesses policies and strategies, addresses social inequality and vulnerable groups, focusing principally on gender and on sexism (information gathered through focus groups). In Spain, 'Women without Borders' address mothers in the attempt to raise their awareness of extremist ideologies, aiming at the creation of a future without fear and violence (information gathered through focus groups).

Finally, some research suggests that certain forms of community policing can promote Muslims' willingness to cooper-

ate with investigators in terrorist prevention. While intrusive counterterrorism policies and practices generally alienate the communities being addressed, perceptions of police legitimacy and fair policing appear to have a strong bearing on Muslims' behavior. Cooperation with the police, in such cases, takes place despite 'the salience of identity within the current political discourse about terrorism and Islam' (Madon, Murphy, & Cherney, 2017: 1144).

Our respondents proposed some measures that share some of the same components with these initiatives. For instance, when advocating the legal documentation and identification of young migrants (lest they 'get lost in the system'), support was given to control systems based on various forms of community policing. These would encourage the willingness of ordinary people and groups to cooperate in the preventive process, favoring at the same time the provision of support and guidance to youth. Included in similar social initiatives were some key actors such as social workers, community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families; virtually all figures, professional or not, involved in the projects described above.

Analyses of the unintended consequences of policy interventions and strategic tactics suggest that 'sometimes these interventions have created backlash effects that led to greater numbers of crimes' (Chermac, Freilich, & Caspi, 2010: 139). As an alternative, the active participation of extremists (or those they purportedly represent) in some areas of policy-making is advocated by some (Dugan & Young, 2010: 164).

In sum, the majority of our respondents concurred that military action abroad has little to no effect, although details regarding the backlash of such action were not captured in the research process. Similarly, cross-border cooperation between police and intelligence agencies was advocated, but the danger of adopting a pre-crime strategy and targeting individuals and groups on mere suspicion was not reckoned with sufficiently. In other words, no potential unintended consequences of increased 'monitoring, arrest and disruption' were anticipated.

4 Conclusion

Informants involved in this research study made no distinction between professional and organized crime, and mainly limited their attention to the activities carried out by the former in criminal markets. In brief, with few exceptions, they neglected the operations conducted by criminal organizations in the official economy and in the legitimate world in general. When discussing the causes of organized crime, they tended to pinpoint learning processes and embrace variables belonging to the tradition of subcultural, control and strain theory. The main dissonance between their views and those found in the criminological literature were manifest in the role they attributed to law enforcers and in the lack of appreciation of the surrogate social order, governance or trust provided by organized crime. In response to organized crime, they advocated social measures whose effectiveness is acknowledged in the criminological literature. They called for technical preventive measures, which are also encouraged or implemented at the European level.

On terrorism, this research found a mismatch, but also some coincidence between the views of informants and those expressed in previous theoretical and empirical work. The mismatch was particularly evident with respect to propaganda and recruitment, while the coincidence pertained to the effect of invasions and wars on the spread of terrorist activity. The role of cultures, which encourage extreme forms of violence, as compared with previous analyses and findings, was overstressed, as was the causative role of the material condition experienced by those joining terrorist networks. Interestingly, there was a high degree of consonance around responses to terrorism, as the types of measures suggested are discussed and valued in the literature and, in part, are already implemented across Europe. This would prove that the process some informants hoped for, which should bring researchers and practitioners closer together is, if only partly, already underway.

References

1. Abbas, T., & Awan, I. (2015). Limits of UK counterterrorism policy and its implications for islamophobia and far right extremism. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 4*(3), 16–29.
2. Adonis. (2016). *Violence and Islam*. Cambridge: Polity.
3. Ahmed, S. (2015). The emotionalization of the War on terror: Counterterrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and helplessness. *Criminology & Criminal Justice, 15*(5), 545–560.
4. Andreano, R., & Siegfried, J. (eds). (1980). *The economics of crime*. New York: John Wiley.
5. Arlacchi, P. (1994). *Addio Cosa Nostra. La vita di Tommaso Buscetta* [Goodbye Cosa Nostra. The life of Tommaso Buscetta]. Milan: Rizzoli.
6. Armao, F. (2000). *Il sistema mafia. Dall'economia-mondo al dominio locale* [The Mafia system. From the global economy to local domain]. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.
7. Buc, P. (2015). *Holy wars, martyrdom and terror*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
8. Chermac, S. M., Freilich, J. D., & Caspi, D. (2010). Policymakers and law enforcement must consider the unintended consequences of their proposed responses to extremist and terrorist groups. In N. A. Frost, J. D. Freilich, & T. R. Clear (eds.), *Contemporary issues in criminal justice policy* (pp. 139–150). Belmont: Wadsworth.
9. Chilcot, J. (2016). *The report of the Iraq inquiry*. London: HMSO.

10. Cloward, R., & Ohlin, L. (1960). *Delinquency and opportunity*. New York: The Free Press.
11. Cohen, A. (1955). *Delinquent boys: The culture of the gang*. New York: The Free Press.
12. Dino, A. (2008). *La mafia devota* [The devoted Mafia]. Rome: Laterza.
13. Dino, A. (2016). *A colloquio con Gaspare Spatuzza* [Interview with Gaspare Spatuzza]. Bologna: Il Mulino.
14. Dino, A., & Ruggiero, V. (2012). Il metodo Mafioso [The Mafia method]. *Special Issue of Studi sulla Questione Criminale, VII*(1), 1–130.
15. Downes, D., & Rock, P. (1988). *Understanding deviance. A guide to the sociology of crime and rule breaking.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
16. Dugan, L., & Young, J. (2010). Allow extremist participation in the policy-making process. In N. A. Frost, J. D. Freilich, & T. R. Clear (eds.), *Contemporary issues in criminal justice policy* (pp. 159–168). Belmont: Wadsworth.
17. Dunn, G. (1996). Major mafia gangs in Russia. *Transnational Organized Crime, 2*(2-3), 63–87.
18. English, R. (ed.). (2016). *Illusions of terrorism and counter-terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. European Commission. (2015). *Commission takes steps to strengthen EU cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime*. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4865_en.htm
20. European Parliament. (2016). *Expectations for EU Action. Fight against terrorism and radicalization*. Strasbourg: Public Opinion Monitoring Unit.
21. Europol. (2011). *EU organised crime threat assessment.* The Hague: Europol Public Information.
22. Ferreira, O. R. (2016). Violent Mexico: Participatory and multipolar violence associated with organized crime. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 10*(1), 41.
23. Fijnaut, C. (2015). European Union organized crime policies. In L. Paoli (ed.), *The Oxford handbook of organized crime* (pp. 572–592). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24. Fiss, O. (2016). *A war like no other: The constitution in a time of terror*. New York: New Press.
25. Gambetta, D. (1992). *La mafia siciliana. Un'industria della protezione privata* [The Sicilian Mafia. A private protection industry]. Turin: Einaudi.
26. Gerges, F. A. (2015). *ISIS. A history*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
27. Gill, P. (2016). *Today we drop bombs, tomorrow we build bridges*. London: Zed Books.
28. Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
29. Hamm, M. S. (2007). *Terrorism as crime*. New York: New York University Press.
30. Hamm, M. S. (2013). *The spectacular few. Prisoner radicalization and the evolving terrorist threat.* New York: New York University Press.
31. Hassner, R. E. (2016). *Religion on the battlefield*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
32. Hayden, M. (2016). *Playing to the edge: American intelligence in the age of terror*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
33. Hemmingby, C. (2017). Exploring the continuum of lethality: Militant islamists' targeting preference in Europe. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 11*(5), 25–41.
34. Hess, H. (1973). *Mafia*. Bari: Laterza.
35. Hobbs, D. (2013). *Lush life: Constructing organized crime in the UK*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36. Hobsbawm, E. J. (1971). *Primitive rebels*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
37. Horkuc, H. (2009). *Said Nursi: Makers of Islamic civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
38. Ismael, J. S., & Ismael, S. T. (2013). The Arab Spring and the uncivil state. *Arab Studies Quarterly, 35*(3), 229–240.
39. Kennedy, H. (2016). *The caliphate*. Harmondsworth: Pelican.
40. Landesco, J. (1969). *Organized crime in Chicago.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
41. Lombroso, C. (1971). *L'uomo delinquente* [The criminal man]. Turin: Bocca.
42. Lynch, M. (2015). *The New Arab wars: Uprising and anarchy in the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs.
43. Madon, N. S., Murphy, K., & Cherney, A. (2017). Promoting community collaboration in counterterrorism: Do social identities and perceptions of legitimacy mediate reactions to procedural justice policing? *British Journal of Criminology, 57*(5), 1144–1164.
44. McCulloch, J., & Pickering, S. (2009). Pre-crime and counter-terrorism. *British Journal of Criminology, 49*(5), 628–645.
45. McDonald, K. (2013). *Our violent world. Terrorism in society*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
46. McIntosh, M. (1975). *The organisation of crime*. London: Macmillan.
47. Merton, R. (1968). *Social theory and social structure*. New York: The Free Press.
48. Milhaupt, C. J., & West, M. D. (2000). The dark side of private ordering: An institutional and empirical analysis of organized crime. *The University of Chicago Law Review, 67*(1), 41–98.
49. Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism. A psychological exploration. *American Psychologist, 60*(2), 161–169.
50. Mythen, G., & Walklate, S. (2006). Criminology and terrorism: Which thesis? Risk society or governmentality? *British Journal of Criminology, 46*(3), 379–398.
51. Peterson, M. (1991). The changes of a decade. *Criminal Organizations, 6*(3-4), 20–2.
52. Rakoff, J. S. (29. 9. 2016). Terror and everybody's rights. *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/09/29/terror-and-everybodys-rights/
53. Ruggiero, V. (2000). *Crime and markets*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
54. Ruggiero, V. (2017). *Dirty money. On financial delinquency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
55. Sacks, J. (2015). *Not in God's name. Confronting religious violence*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
56. Sageman, M. (2017). *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
57. Santos, F., & Machado, H. (21. 9. 2016). *Fighting cross-border crime and terrorism in the EU.* Paper presented at the European Society of Criminology Conference, Munster University, Munster.
58. Sen, A. (2015). *The country of first boys and other essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
59. Shaw, C. (1930). *The Jack-Roller: A delinquent boy's own story*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
60. Small, T. (23. 9. 2016). Wars of religion. *Times Literary Supplement*. Retrieved from https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/wars-of-religion/

61. Smith, B. K., Figueroa-Caballero, A., Chan, S., Kovacs, R., Middo, E., et al. (2016). Framing daesh: Failures and consequences. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 10*(4), 42–52.
62. Thrasher, F. (1927). *The gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
63. Todorov, T. (2014). *The inner enemies of democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
64. Toscano, R. (2016). Il tempo della paura [The time of fear]. *Micro Mega, 2,* 119–128.
65. Varese, F. (2017). *Mafia life*. London: Profile.
66. Varese, F. (ed.). (2010). *Organized crime: Critical concepts in criminology*. London: Routledge.
67. Victoroff, J., & Kruglanski, A. W. (eds.). (2009). *Psychology of terrorism: Classic and contemporary insights*. London: Psychology Press.
68. Walklate, S., & Mythen, G. (2016). Fractured lives, splintered knowledge: Making criminological sense of the January 2015 terrorist attack in Paris. *Critical Criminology, 24*(3), 333–346.
69. Wheatcroft, G. (13. 10. 2016). Tony Blair's eternal shame: The report. *The New York Review of Books.* Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/13/tony-blairs-eternal-shame-chilcot-report/
70. Whyte, F. W. (1943). *Street comer society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
71. Wills, G. (24. 3. 2016). My Koran problem. *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/03/24/my-koran-problem/
72. Wolfendale, J. (2007). Terrorism, security and the threat of counter-terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30*(1), 75–92.
73. Zedner, L. (2000). The Pursuit of Security. In T. Hope, & R. Sparks (eds.), *Crime, risk and insecurity* (pp. 56–58). London and New York: Routledge.

Organizirana kriminaliteta in teroristične mreže: študija o pogledih strokovnjakov kazenskega pravosodja in drugih strokovnjakov z uporabo mešanih raziskovalnih metod

Dr. Vincenzo Ruggiero, profesor, Pravna fakulteta, Univerza v Middlesexu, VB. E-pošta: v.ruggiero@mdx.ac.uk

V prispevku je predstavljen analitični povzetek raziskovalnega projekta o dejavnostih, vzrokih in odzivih na organizirano kriminaliteto in terorizem. Na podlagi pogledov praktikov, kot so socialni delavci, učitelji, uslužbenci, ki izvajajo kazenski pregon, in drugih strokovnjakov smo preučevali njihove potrebe, interpretacije, negotovosti in perspektive. Njihove poglede smo primerjali z ugotovitvami preteklih analiz in študij ter poudarili naključja in disonance, ki so značilne za tovrstno preučevanje organizirane kriminalitete in terorističnih mrež.

Ključne besede: organizirana kriminaliteta, teroristične mreže, spodbujevalniki, institucionalni odzivi, prevencija

UDK: 343.341:343.3