

# Public Risk Perspectives Regarding the Threat of Terrorism in Belgrade: Implications for Risk Management Decision-Making for Individuals, Communities and Public Authorities

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The aim of this paper is to assess the risk of terrorist attacks as perceived by individuals, the local community as a whole, and municipal public safety officials in Belgrade, the capital of the Republic of Serbia. The structured questionnaire about perceived risk of terrorist attacks and preparedness was developed using close-ended, multiple choice questions and questionnaire items featuring 5-point Likert response options. Data were collected between June and September 2017 by a telephone survey using a random digit dialing procedure; 485 adult Serbian residents participated in the research voluntarily. Study participants exhibited low levels of perception vis-a-vis the future likelihood of terrorist attacks occurring in their communities, and only a moderate knowledge of counter-terrorism activities currently being undertaken by public safety authorities. Other responses to our questionnaire indicated statistically significant differences in perception of the risks of terrorism threats in Belgrade with respect to demographic variables such as age, gender, employment and past exposure to major emergencies. We encourage emergency management agencies in Serbia to use the differences in public perception of risks identified in our study to develop enhanced counter-terrorism preparedness measures through the promotion of behavioural change. Such action goes hand-in-hand with the adoption of improved risk management decision-making procedures. Furthermore, to improve risk management decision-making we need to anticipate virtually all possible scenarios because terrorism is now a clear and present danger to the safety of the citizens of Serbia. All cities and towns in Serbia need to have up-to-date disaster plans that are tailored to specific scenarios and locations as opposed to only preconceived generalized plans.

**Keywords:** terrorism, risk perception, threat, preparedness, decision-making, Belgrade

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## 1 Introduction

Terrorism risks are complex phenomena and have great potential to evoke deep public concern (Jarrett, 2005). In the literature there are a variety of definitions of terrorism stem-

ming from the different perspectives of politicians, academics, security experts, etc. Schwenkenbecher (2012: 14) defined terrorism as a strategy or a tactic that employs violence or force in order to reach political objectives. Public perceptions of the risk of terrorism are very important for directing risk management decision-making, and for preparedness planning. Regarding public risk perception of terrorism threats, the following specific characteristics were examined in order to identify methods to more effectively implement new initiatives aimed at strengthening the management of terrorism risks (Cvetković, 2017). Also, this information can be used to inform risk communication strategies. Generally, preparedness may be defined as the knowledge, capabilities and actions of governments, organizations, community groups, and individuals “to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions” (UNISDR, 2009). The preparedness level of individuals is determined by assessing the degree to which such persons use material and intellectual resources such as emergency funds and personal disaster kits; timely access to disas-

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ter alerts and knowledge of evacuation routes, and the strength of their social support networks (e.g., families, churches, local response organizations) (Cvetković, Ristanović, & Gačić, 2018; Reininger et al, 2013). On the other hand, household preparedness is determined by assessing level of risk knowledge and actions taken such as: 1) developing an emergency plan; 2) possessing a family emergency kit in the home; and 3) having enough reserve of food, water, and medical supplies to last at least 72 hours (Cvetković et al., 2018; Levac, Toal, & O'Sullivan, 2012). Adequate individual and household preparedness have been shown to strengthen individual resilience to trauma as well as possibly deterring a potential terrorist attack if the terrorists believe that the attack may be less successful due to high levels of preparedness among individuals, households and communities (Eisenman et al. 2006).

Prior studies on public risk perception have found that several factors (e.g., gender, age, income level, education) tend to influence citizen's perceptions of terrorism risk. Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) have reported that almost half of their survey respondents perceived the average American as being likely to be hurt in a terrorist attack within the coming year. Eisenman et al. (2006) found a significantly lower frequency of individual-level preparedness for terrorism in Los Angeles County compared with populations considered more vulnerable to a terrorist event. Drakos and Muller (2014) investigated whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk perception in several European countries for the period 2003–2007. Their results showed that observed terrorism risk – perception variation among these countries was related to relative numbers of terrorist attacks experienced by a given country. In other words, average propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. According to Shay (2017), the Balkans are believed by Islamic terrorist organizations to be the gateway to the heart of Europe. The strategic importance of this fact cannot be overemphasized. Islamic terrorist groups hope to use countries in the Balkans such as Serbia to promote their activities in Western Europe, Russia, and other focal points worldwide. Furthermore, militant “home-grown” Islamic fundamentalism is rapidly spreading in countries such as Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania (Ranstorp & Xhudo, 1994). Regarding the Republic of Serbia, it has a long history of terrorist threats. Starting from the end of the Second World War onwards, there have been two major lines of terrorism threats: ideologically motivated terrorism during former Yugoslavia, and separatist terrorism related to Albanians' aspirations for the separation of Kosovo and Metohija that escalated during the 90s (Erjavec & Volcic, 2006). Nowadays, the Republic of Serbia is, besides the continuous threat of Albanian terrorism, faced with international terrorism occasioned by religious extremism.

The only official document containing a terrorism threat assessment for the Republic of Serbia is the “National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for the Period 2017–2021.” It holds that the threat of terrorism is real and events are possible. An ongoing delicate security situation in Kosovo and Metohija and an unfolding drama in the Middle East and Africa all have an impact on the Western Balkans region. Serbia, as well as its immediate neighbourhood, is faced with increased radicalization and extremism that can lead to active terrorism if precursors to the use of violence are not properly addressed. Networking among the proponents of radical Islamist movements is taking place. They intend to spread radical ideas, and take advantage of conditions of the massive influx of migrants and the return of terrorist fighters from conflict areas to Serbia and/or to the region. The Republic of Serbia is even more vulnerable and exposed to threat of a terrorism than any of its neighbours. The exact number of Islamic State supporters and members from Serbia is very difficult to determine, as are their intentions and their interest in conducting an attack in Serbia. There are no annual surveys assessing Serbian citizens who have left Syria and Iraq, but according to the Serbian Military Agency most Serbs remained in Europe in 2013 and 2014. Only 26 individuals are still believed to be fighting with ISIS or Al Nusra in Syria and Iraq. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia mentions only that the Republic of Serbia, in terms of global terrorism, “may be the target of terrorist activity, both directly and using its territory for the preparation and execution of terrorist actions in other countries” (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2017a, 2017b). It also points out that the Republic of Serbia is facing transnational and cross-border crime, making the link between terrorism and all forms of organized crime particularly important.

The Chief of the Department for Combating Terrorism of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, however, posts that the likelihood of a terrorist attack is low at the moment of the writing of this article. Nevertheless, he points to the phenomenon of increasing radicalization in Serbia, especially to the phenomenon of “self-radicalization” of a significant number of young people that find themselves not accepted by their family, by the broader society, or by the specific area in which they live. To avoid experiencing transition from radicalization to terrorism he suggests taking some preventive measures, including high criminal penalties, monitoring of those engaged in propaganda and recruitment, as well as using administrative measures to prohibit foreign citizens and religious authorities from spreading the ideology of radical Islam (Radio Television of Serbia, 2016). These risk forecasts are similar to those issued by Aon Risk Solutions, a leading global risk management group working in partnership with the Risk Advisory Group. They created the Global Terrorism

Map to provide insight for businesses aiming to reduce their exposure to risk. The risk of terrorism and political violence in Serbia, according to this map, is rated as medium, and “a low to medium” for the Balkans generally (Balkan Insight, 2015). Finally, the United States Department of State’s Crime and Safety Report 2016 for Serbia reconfirms the medium rated terrorism threat, placing emphasis on Serbia’s geographical position as a main transit route to Western Europe from Africa and the Middle East. This report also expressed concern of the consequences of involvement of fighters from a variety of Muslim communities in the Balkans in the Syrian conflict, noting that their radicalization might lead in turn to the creation of local terrorism aspirations once back home (United States Department of State, 2016).

Starting from the above-mentioned condition regarding terrorism in Serbia, this paper presents evidence of citizens’ perceived risk of terrorist attacks and level of preparedness. With regard to public risk perception of terrorism threats, the following specific dimensions were examined as required steps in identifying methods to effectively perform initiatives aimed at the management of terrorism risks: these involve gauging perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist attacks, assessing the adequacy of preparedness and security countermeasures, identifying potential consequences, determining most likely methods of attack, and designating the most likely places of these potential terrorist attacks.

## 2 Terrorism Risk Perception and Preparedness: Literature Review

Numerous studies have found that gender is an important factor affecting public perception of terrorism threats (Dosman, Adamowicz, & Hrudehy, 2001; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Lerner et al., 2003; Slovic, Malmfors, Krewski, Mertz, Neil, & Bartlett, 1995). Previous research has found that men generally perceive a lower level of risk than women (Floyd & Pennington-Gray, 2004; Lai & Tao, 2003; Slovic, 1999). Slovic (1999) has reported that men generally report lower risk estimates, in a range of settings, than women. Lerner et al. (2003) show that women reported greater levels of fear whereas men reported greater levels of anger in relation to acts of terrorism. Lai and Tao (2003) have reported that older people tend to give higher risk estimates than younger people. On the other hand, Floyd and Pennington-Gray (2004) found no relationship between age and risk perception in their research. In addition, a good number of scholars (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003; Nacos, 2003; Picard, 1993) have highlighted the fact that perceptions of terrorism are influenced by social media such as news and information from others in one’s social

circles, information which contributes to everyone feeling vulnerable like some kind of target. In terms of marital status, this variable does not appear significantly correlated to terrorism perception (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Kamarulnizam, Sukma, Jamhari, & Musa, 2012).

Besides demographic factors, other social-psychological factors may bear a relationship with terrorism risk perceptions (Floyd, Gibson, Pennington-Gray, & Thapa, 2004; Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley, 2005; Lerner et al., 2003; Sjöberg, 1998). It was found in some studies that citizens with lower education levels and lower incomes rate risks much higher compared to others (Adeola, 2004; Kanan & Pruitt, 2002). One of the studies concerning the perceived threat of terrorist attacks threat in Australia indicated that those with no formal educational qualifications were significantly more likely to think that a terrorist attack is either very or extremely likely to occur in Australia. This same study also reported evidence of a correlation between terrorism threat perception and the place of residence, with those living in urban health districts being significantly more likely to be either very or extremely concerned that they or their family would be directly affected in the event of a terrorist attack than those living in rural health districts. Those from rural health districts were much less fearful of terrorist attacks (Stevens, Agho, Taylor, Barr, Raphael, & Jorm, 2009).

Additionally, a citizen’s geographical location also has influence on the perceptions of terrorism risk (Friedman, 2005; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). Different levels of concerns were found with respect to the likelihood that they themselves would be harmed by the event (Heath, Liao, & Douglas, 2009). That kind of concern is very important because citizens, by also following the advice of government experts, could change their behavior in public places by avoiding mass events and use of public transport at critical times (Lee, Chen, Pietz, & Benecke, 2009). Better handling of uncertain situations such as terrorism attacks is possible in settings where people have a high level of trust in their government (Crijns, Cauberghe, & Hudders, 2017; Gray & Ropeik, 2002; Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, Wessely, & Krieger, 2007). It is very important to note that when both the threat and the efficacy of citizens preparedness are perceived as high, there is likely ample motivation on the part of citizens to protect themselves from terrorist attacks. This is a key phenomenon in preparedness planning, which is well explained in Witte’s (1992) *Extended Parallel Processing Model* (EPPM).

A few studies (Canneti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Davis & Silver, 2004; Eisenman et al., 2009) have dealt with ethnicity and intercultural differences in terrorist threat perception. A Los Angeles County popu-

lation survey indicated that African Americans, Latinos, Chinese Americans, Korean Americans, and non-US citizens were more likely to perceive population-level risk as being high than non-migrant citizens (Eisenman et al., 2009). Lemyre, Turner, Lee and Krewski (2006) found that terrorism was a low to moderate threat for the Canadian population, and an even lower threat to themselves as individuals. Woods, Eyck, Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh (2008) found a positive relationship between people's proximity to a "primary" terrorist target and their judgments of the likelihood of a terrorist attack in their home communities in the next 12 months. They also found this relationship being especially strong among female respondents, and among people with household incomes in the lower range. Also, research has been conducted on how three different cultures (Christian American, Chinese, and Islamic) perceive the route of terrorism, showing no significant difference between Islamic and Chinese respondents, who both differed from their Christian American counterparts (Yueh-Ting, Takaku, Ottati, & Yan, 2004). Finally, interesting research was conducted regarding the effects of fear and anger on perceived risks of terrorism (Lerner et al., 2003). The results of this study showed that experiencing anger towards terrorism triggered more optimistic beliefs, rather than to experiencing fear, which triggered greater pessimism. In addition, it was shown that these emotions also influence public policy preferences. Primed anger activated more punitive preferences, and fear enhanced preferences for conciliatory policies and preventive measures.

Public perception of terrorism threats clearly is affected by different demographic (e.g., gender, age, marital status) and social-psychological factors (e.g., education level, geographical location, culture, and degree of fear). Understanding how these factors affect behaviour is critical for strengthening counter-terrorism preparedness measures through the promotion of desired behavioral change. As our research has shown, prior research on community-level understanding and citizen perceptions of terrorism threats highlight the importance of understanding how demographic and social-psychological factors on public terrorism risk perception are affecting preparedness planning in the Republic of Serbia.

### 3 History of Terrorist Attacks in Serbia

The emergence of terrorism in Serbia was at its very beginning deeply rooted in ideology. During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia terrorist activity was related to revolutionary anti-royalist organisations such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and the Ustaše (Croatian fascist organisation). A major terrorist attack during this part of Serbia's history occurred on the occasion of

King Alexander I of Yugoslavia's visit to France in Marseilles on October 9, 1934. The King was assassinated by IMRO's terrorist Vlado Georgiev Chernozemski while riding in a car with the French foreign affairs minister, who also died in the attack. The motive behind the terrorist attack was political in its nature; IMRO's main goal was the secession of Vardar Macedonia from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Roudometof, 2002: 93). The same tendencies were developed in Croatia among Croatian Ustaše, who supported IMRO during the whole operation.

Terrorism maintained its ideological cast in Yugoslavia even after World War II. had ended. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was succeeded by the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, and terrorism became the weapon of those animated by anti-communist ideological sentiments, involving Četnici and Ustaše for the most part. The common denominator of all terrorist attacks in this period was that the majority of terrorist attacks were conducted outside the territory of Yugoslavia and were directed against diplomatic missions, embassies and diplomats of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav intelligence and security services disabled most of the terrorist efforts to conduct a terrorist attack on Yugoslavian soil (Independent Newspaper, 2016). The majority of illegally infiltrated terrorists were arrested and executed, but some of the terrorist attacks outside the borders of Yugoslavia resulted in the assassination of Yugoslav diplomats. Some examples are the murders of Yugoslav consul Vicko Glumcic in Naples in 1946, Yugoslav consul Edvin Zdovec in Frankfurt in 1976, ambassador Vladimir Rolović in Stockholm on April 7, 1971, as well as the failed assassination attempts on the Yugoslav ambassador in Germany in 1966 and of the Yugoslav vice-consul in Lyon in 1969 (Gibas-Krzak, 2013). Undoubtedly, the most spectacular terrorist attack occurred on September 10, 1976 when the Chicago-New York flight was hijacked by five "Fighters for Free Croatia". The perpetrators were all arrested, but one police officer died while dismantling an explosive device (Pratt, 2011). However, one of the biggest successfully conducted terrorist attacks of that period in Yugoslavia was the bombing of the cinema "20.oktobar" in Belgrade in 1968. This attack, conducted by the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood's (Ustaše) member Miljenko Hrkač, resulted in one person being killed and 85 people being injured (Schindler, 2005).

Rail and train station bombings were also a frequent model for terrorist attacks inside Yugoslavia, which happened in 1968 leaving 13 people injured and in 1973 in a cloakroom of a train station in Belgrade, leaving one dead and eight people injured. Mine explosions, smoke bombings, demolitions and arson directed against Yugoslav premises and properties abroad were also frequent methods of terrorist activity from 1946 all the way up to the beginning of 1990s (Bieber, 2003).



Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, starting in the 1990s, Serbia has been facing various kinds of terrorism, but primarily those related to Albanians' aspirations for the separation of Kosovo and Metohija. The main terrorist organisation, the Kosovo Liberation Army, emerged around 1992. Having gained access to weapons from looted armouries when Albania's government collapsed in 1997, the KLA established training camps in northern Albania around Krume, Kukes, and Bajram Curri (Anderson & Sloan, 2009: 361). Terrorist acts were directed primarily against the military and police officers of the Republic of Serbia, but also against Albanians as an act of intimidation to those loyal to the Republic of Serbia.

The attack on a police patrol on February 28, 1998 in the village of Likošane was the first serious hint of a large-scale rebellion entailing the use of terrorist methods. During September of 1998 terrorist attacks continued resulting in a number of civilian massacres. One of them which took place in Glodjane resulted in 30 corpses of Serbian, Albanian and Roma nationality being found. Bullet holes on the nearby wall of the canal where victims had been found indicated that they had been shot at that place while pieces of barbed wire and electric cables found at the same place indicating they had previously been held and tortured (B92, 2007). The attacks on civilians continued, including one on Serbian teenagers in a bar near Peć, and then in July 1999 when 14 Kosovo Serb farmers were killed in the village of Staro Gracko after returning from a day of harvesting wheat. This was an act condemned worldwide (BBC News, 1999). The bodies were disfigured, with the youngest of the victims being only four years old.

Shortly after the war in Kosovo and Metohija, the KLA was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps until it was finally disbanded in 2009. However, it was replaced by a newly formed terrorist organisation called the Albanian National Army (ANA). Given the fact that the organizational and operational core of ANA consisted of the leaders and members of the former Kosovo Liberation Army, it continued its main goals and activities (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2017b).

Despite the presence of international forces which were deployed as a peacekeeping mission, the use of terrorist methods by Albanian terrorists continued. On February 16, 2001 another terrorist attack was carried out by activating a roadside bomb on the main road in the village of Livadice, near Podujevo. The first bus out of six in a convoy being escorted by KFOR and transporting displaced Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija to Gracanica was blown up, leaving 12 civilians killed and 43 injured (Sputnik News, 2016). One of the most atrocious terrorist attacks on civilians took place in the town of Goraždevac in 2003. On August 13, two Kosovo Serb

teenagers were killed and four severely injured when Kosovo Albanian extremists opened fire on them while they were by the river. Since the citizens of Goraždevac were persistent in their decision not to leave their homes even if constantly terrorized by violence, the attack on the children is considered to be an instance of retribution and the biggest political message to be sent (Evening News, 2015).

The situation with terrorist attacks worsened dramatically in March 2004. An escalation of violence started with the report of Kosovo media about deaths of three Kosovar Albanian boys who drowned in a river in the Albanian village of Cabra near Zubin Potok after jumping into the river fleeing from older Serbian young men. According to police evidence, over the course of the next seven days there were 33 individual riots conducted with about 51,000 people being involved. The consequences of Albanian attacks on Serbian villages were that 28 people were killed and 870 were injured from both communities. The attackers also burned or blew up about 30 Serbian churches, damaged 11 churches and monasteries, and destroyed 286 houses in addition to destroying 72 UN vehicles (B92 Net, 2018).

Despite numerous peace treaties, there is still an ongoing terrorist threat in Kosovo and Metohija to this very day. All public events in Kosovo and Metohija, especially religious gatherings, are assessed as carrying the risk of a terrorist attack (N1, 2017). Continuous violence differing widely in intensity persists. In July 2009, an attack on a Gendarmerie vehicle resulted in the injury of two officers, and in February 2010, an ethnic-Albanian member of the Serbian police force in Bujanovac was targeted by a car bomb, which injured him and his family seriously (Fulton, 2010: 134).

According to available data, the Serbian government claimed that over the period January 1 1998 to June 10 1999 the Kosovo Liberation Army killed 988 people and kidnapped 287, and that an additional 847 were killed and another 1,154 were kidnapped in the period from June 10, 1999 to November 11, 2001, after NATO had taken control over Kosovo (Anderson & Sloan, 2009: 363). According to the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia for the period from 1991 to 2004, 10,954 terrorist attacks were conducted with 6,590 persons being killed. Nearly, three in four (74%) of the victims (4,922 persons) were civilians, 18% (1,310 persons) were police officers, and only 8% military (358 soldiers) (Stevanović, 2016: 44). According to data of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, there are about 280,000 internally displaced and expelled persons from Kosovo and Metohija (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 1991). The most common forms of activities of Albanian terrorists were setting up ambush and placing mine-explosive devices on roads and bridges.

## 4 Methods

The aim of this paper is to determine the citizens' perceived risk of terrorist attack and level of preparedness, as viewed in a gender perspective. Regarding public risk perception of terrorism threats, the following variables were analysed: 1) perception of the likelihood of terrorist attacks; 2) preparedness levels of individuals, households, security services and the community at-large; 3) potential consequences; 4) terrorist attack methods utilized; and 5) most likely terrorist attack locations (See Table 1). Further explanations are included at the bottom of Table 1. At different times of day, between June and September 2017, survey data were collected by means of a telephone survey using a random digit dialing procedure with a contact rate being 68%, and the refusal rate being 39%. In our research, 485 (29%) respondents participated with informed consent gained from all participating subjects. T-test (analysing gender and employment status) and ANOVA analysis (looking at variables such as age, marital status and education

level) were chosen to examine the relationship between different factors and each dependent variable.

### 4.1 Survey Instruments

Twenty-one close-ended, multiple choice and 5-point Likert scale questions based on widely-accepted data collection methods (Fischhoff et al., 2006; Wolff & Larsen, 2014; Woods et al., 2008) were asked in order to identify perceived risk of terrorist attacks and levels of preparedness. The first part of the questionnaire is related to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (15 items) of the interviewees, and the second part is related to perception of the likelihood of the terrorist attacks, state of preparedness (household, community) and security, potential consequences, expected methods and place of the terrorist attacks. The above-mentioned items were arrayed on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).

**Table 1:** Set of independent variables about terrorism threats risk perception of citizens in Belgrade

	Variable	M	S.D.
<b>Perception of the likelihood</b>	One year likelihood of occurrence	2.26	1.05
	Five years likelihood of occurrence	2.61	1.05
	Ten years likelihood of occurrence	2.89	1.15
<b>Perception of the level of preparedness and security</b>	Individual preparedness	2.74	1.32
	Household preparedness	3.13	.99
	Community preparedness	2.35	1.01
	Personal security	3.23	1.14
	Fear	2.55	1.12
<b>Perception of the consequences</b>	Loss of life	2.09	.997
	Injuries	2.46	1.03
	Material consequences	2.48	1.07
<b>Perception of the execution method</b>	Cold weapons	2.01	1.01
	Fire weapons	2.98	1.03
	Explosive	3.45	.95
	Chemical weapons	2.72	1.22
	Biological weapons	2.67	1.23
	Nuclear weapons	2.26	1.36
	Public place	3.63	1.15
	Public building	3.49	1.12
<b>Perception of the potential place of the terrorist attack</b>	Airplane	3.31	1.11
	Bus	2.87	1.09
	Train	2.78	1.08
	Public authorities and personalities	2.72	1.18
	Health care institutions	2.66	1.18

## 4.2 Sample

The interviewees included 58.4% women and 41.6% men (95% fully completed questionnaire), and the average age of respondents was 36 years old. The most highly represented category included those younger than 34. The majority of respondents had secondary educational degree. Regarding marital status, single people account for 40.1% of the sample. The majority of the respondents are employed (Table 2).

**Table 2:** Basic demographic and socio-economic information of respondents (n=485)

Variable	Category	f	%
Gender	Male	202	41.6
	Female	283	58.4
Age	Younger (18-38)	290	59.7
	Middle aged (39-59)	120	24.7
	Elderly (over 59)	75	15.4
Education level	Secondary	352	72.5
	High school	51	10.5
	University	82	16.9
Marital status	Single	195	40.1
	In relationship	138	28.4
	Married	152	31.3
Employment status	Yes	220	45.3
	No	265	54.6


## 5 Results

### 5.1 Terrorism Risk Perception and Preparedness

In Figure 1 the authors summarize the percentage of respondents and related Likert scale values given for likelihood of occurrence of terrorist attacks. Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood of a terrorist attack first in the next year, and then in five years, and then in ten years. The average value of the expected likelihood of terrorist attack in the next year is 2.26, five years 2.61 and 10 years 2.89. Further analysis indicates that 56.7% of respondents do not expect a terrorist attack in the next year, 41.8% in the next five years and 28.9% in the next ten years. In accordance with the obtained results, it can be said with confidence that most citizens expect a terrorist attack in the next ten years (Figure 1).

Perceptions of one year likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks varied significantly by gender  $t(317.2) = 2.84, p = .005$ ; age  $F(2,481) = 7.41, p = .001$  and by marital status  $F(3,481) = 19.26, p = .000$ , but did not vary by either education level  $F(3,482) = 1.87, p = .142$  or employment status  $t(350) = 1.24, p = .172$ . It was found that men, the elderly, married persons, reported higher mean perception of terrorist attacks in the next year compared to the women, younger people and single persons (Table 3).

By contrast, regarding five years likelihood, perceptions did not significantly vary by gender  $F(300.9) = -.231, p = .817$  and employment status  $F(470) = .489, p = .625$ , but did significantly vary by age  $F(2,482) = 13.30, p = .000$ , marital status  $F(3,481) = 28.17, p = .000$ , and education level  $F(3,482) =$



**Figure 1:** Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for one, ten and five years' likelihood of occurrence of terrorist attacks

3.84,  $p = .012$ . It was found that younger, married, and people with secondary school all reported higher mean perception of the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the next five years compared to the elderly, single persons, and people with university degrees (Table 3).

Perceptions of ten years likelihood did not significantly vary by gender  $t(324.6) = -1.02, p = .305$ ; employment status  $t(480) = -.356, p = .707$ , or education level  $F(3,482) = 2.02, p = .055$ , but significantly varied by age  $F(2,482) = 6.1, p = .003$ ; and marital status  $F(3, 481) = 12.19, p = .000$ . It was found that the elderly and married reported higher mean perception of the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the next five years compared to their younger and single counterparts (Table 3).


In addition to assessing the level of likelihood of a terrorist attack, respondents were asked to assess the level of their own individual preparedness, household preparedness, community preparedness to respond, and their personal security. In Figure 2, the authors summarize the percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for individuals, households and community preparedness with assessment of personal security. It was found that the perception of individual preparedness is  $M = 2.74$ , household preparedness  $M = 3.13$  and community preparedness  $M = 2.35$ . In addition, 55.6% of the respondents believe that the local community is unprepared to respond, 45.1% that the citizens are unprepared, and 24.7% that households are unprepared. Regarding the results presented, the respondents mostly feel that households are prepared for responding to emergency situations caused by terrorist attacks (Figure 2).

**Table 3:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores) on a perception the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks

	Gender		Age			Education level			Marital status			Employment status	
	Men	Women	Younger	Middle aged	Elderly	Secondary	High	University	Single	In relationship	Married	Employed	Unemployed
<b>One year likelihood occurrence</b>	2.44 (1.29)	2.14 (.830)	2.17 (.904)	2.22 (.998)	2.68 (1.51)	2.33 (1.15)	2.01 (.900)	2.26 (.894)	1.86 (.976)	2.28 (.816)	2.71 (1.20)	2.35 (1.30)	2.21 (.873)
<b>Five years likelihood occurrence</b>	2.59 (1.33)	2.62 (.792)	2.51 (.929)	2.39 (.852)	1.44 (.165)	2.64 (1.21)	2.74 (.446)	2.48 (1.10)	2.30 (.949)	2.52 (.905)	3.13 (1.08)	2.64 (1.31)	2.59 (.850)
<b>Ten years likelihood occurrence</b>	2.83 (1.40)	2.94 (.934)	2.87 (1.14)	2.69 (.861)	3.29 (1.44)	2.85 (1.34)	3.29 (.565)	2.84 (.910)	2.78 (1.22)	2.86 (1.08)	3.20 (1.15)	2.87 (1.31)	2.91 (1.05)

\* In parentheses shown standard deviation.





**Figure 2:** Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for individual, household and community preparedness with assessment of personal security

Individual preparedness perception significantly varied by gender  $t(1,483) = 97.55, p = .000$ ; age  $F(2,482) = 22.16, p = .001$  and marital status  $F(3,482) = 15.30, p = .000$ ; employment status  $F(1,483) = 36.44, p = .000$ , but did not significantly vary by education level  $F(3,481) = 0.851, p = .063$ . It was found that men, the middle aged, married persons, and employed persons reported higher mean individual preparedness level compared to the women, younger persons, respondents in a relationship, and unemployed persons (Table 4).

Household preparedness perception varied significantly by gender  $t(1,483) = 39.43, p = .000$ ; age  $F(2,482) = 28.32, p = .001$ ; by education level  $F(3,482) = 11.41, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,482) = 29.74, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 22.68, p = .000$ . It was found that the men, younger, respondents with secondary education, married persons, and employed persons reported higher mean household preparedness levels compared to women, the middle aged, respondents with university education, single persons, and unemployed persons (Table 4).

Community preparedness perception significantly varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 4.96, p = .026$ ; age  $F(2,482) = 13.02, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 4.58, p = .005$ ; by marital status  $F(3,482) = 6.85, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 19.10, p = .000$ . It was found that men, the elderly, respondents with secondary education, married persons, and employed persons reported higher mean community preparedness levels compared to the women, younger persons, respondents with university education, those in a relationship, and unemployed persons (Table 4).

Personal security perception varied significantly by gender  $F(1,483) = 67.68, p = .000$ ; age  $F(2,482) = 10.93, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,482) = 13.93, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 5.45, p = .020$ , but did not vary significantly by education level  $F(3,481) = 1.91, p = .056$ . It was found that men, middle aged persons, single persons, and employed persons reported higher mean personal security level compared to women, younger people, married persons, and unemployed people (Table 4).

**Table 4:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for preparedness and security perception


	Gender		Age			Education level			Marital status			Employment status	
	Men	Women	Younger	Middle aged	Elderly	Secondary	High	University	Single	In relationship	Married	Employed	Unemployed
<b>Individual preparedness</b>	3.38 (1.16)	2.28 (1.23)	2.50 (1.33)	3.43 (.959)	2.68 (1.38)	2.65 (1.41)	3.34 (1.11)	2.69 (1.14)	2.76 (1.55)	2.35 (1.11)	2.99 (1.07)	3.18 (1.28)	2.46 (1.26)
<b>Household preparedness</b>	3.47 (.95)	2.89 (.94)	2.91 (.983)	2.62 (1.01)	2.68 (1.06)	3.26 (.969)	3.39 (.495)	2.91 (1.06)	3.21 (.940)	2.60 (.863)	3.53 (.956)	3.39 (.923)	2.97 (.999)
<b>Community preparedness</b>	2.47 (.94)	2.26 (1.03)	2.16 (.944)	2.62 (1.01)	2.68 (1.06)	2.38 (1.01)	2.65 (.582)	2.17 (1.08)	2.35 (1.11)	2.10 (.930)	2.56 (.919)	2.60 (1.06)	2.19 (.932)
<b>Personal security</b>	3.70 (1.03)	2.90 (1.09)	3.07 (1.14)	3.67 (.797)	3.26 (1.38)	3.15 (1.40)	3.68 (1.01)	3.29 (1.24)	3.64 (1.18)	2.78 (.94)	3.43 (1.17)	3.38 (1.01)	3.14 (1.21)

\* In parentheses shown standard deviation.

### 5.2 Perceptions of consequences of terrorist attacks

Respondents were asked to assess the level of probability for loss of life, injuries and material consequences during terrorist attacks. In Figure 3, authors summarize the percentage of respondents and related Likert scale values given for perception of loss of life, injuries and material consequences in

terrorist attacks. In relation to the mean values of the scores, the lowest number of respondents ( $M = 2.09$ ) believe that they could lose their lives, sustain injuries ( $M = 2.46$ ), and suffer material consequences ( $M = 2.48$ ). In relation to the Likert scale, 14% of respondents believe that due to terrorist attacks they could experience material consequences, then injures 13.2% and lose their lives 5.2% (Figure 3).



**Figure 3:** Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for perception of loss of life, injuries and material consequences

Perception of lost of life risk in terrorist attacks varied significantly by gender  $F(1,483) = 9.31, p = .002$ ; age  $F(2,482) = 60.94, p = .001$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 10.50, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 7.72, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 34.54, p = .000$ . It was found that women, younger persons, unemployed persons, married people, and respondents with university education reported higher mean perception of life loss compared to men than the elderly, employed, respondents in relationship, and persons with secondary education (Table 5).

Perception of injuries in terrorist attacks varied significantly by gender  $F(1,483) = 10.53, p = .001$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 68.32, p = .001$ ; by education level  $F(3,482) = 11.69, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 15.38, p = .000$ ; and via employment status  $F(1,483) = 36.26, p = .000$ . It was found that women, younger persons, the unemployed, and respondents in relationship, with university education reported higher mean perception of injuries compared to men, the middle aged, the employed, the married, and respondents with secondary education (Table 5).

Perception of material consequences in terrorist attacks varied significantly by gender  $F(1,483) = 15.11, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 27.96, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,482) = 22.08, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 11.27, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 19.99, p = .000$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, the married, younger reported higher mean perception of material consequences compared to men, the employed, those respondents in relationship, and the elderly (Table 5).


### 5.3 Terrorist attacks method perception

In relation to the obtained mean values, the respondents mostly point out that the terrorist groups could use explosives ( $M = 3.45$ ), fire weapons ( $M = 2.98$ ), chemical weapons ( $M = 2.72$ ), biological weapons ( $M = 2.67$ ), radiological weapons ( $M = 2.36$ ), nuclear weapons ( $M = 2.26$ ), and cold weapons ( $M = 2.01$ ). Thus, most respondents point out (44.4%) that terrorist groups could use explosives, and the lowest number of respondents points out (5%) cold weapons (Figure 4).

**Table 5:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of likelihood of loss of life, injuries and material consequences of terrorist attacks

	Gender		Age			Education level			Marital status			Employment status	
	Men	Women	Younger	Middle aged	Elderly	Secondary	High	University	Single	In relationship	Married	Employed	Unemployed
<b>Loss of life</b>	1.93 (.763)	2.21 (1.12)	2.40 (1.04)	1.57 (.533)	1.63 (.814)	1.90 (.891)	2.26 (.950)	2.36 (1.12)	2.11 (1.08)	2.29 (1.04)	3.01 (.001)	1.78 (.807)	2.28 (1.054)
<b>Injuries</b>	2.09 (.859)	2.72 (1.07)	2.77 (1.08)	1.85 (.959)	2.08 (.583)	2.27 (.886)	2.61 (.495)	2.86 (.763)	2.48 (1.10)	2.83 (1.11)	2.02 (.000)	2.14 (.733)	2.65 (1.143)
<b>Material consequences</b>	2.27 (.976)	2.64 (1.12)	2.71 (1.14)	2.26 (.869)	1.92 (.979)	2.29 (1.09)	2.95 (.226)	2.59 (1.09)	2.41 (.997)	2.70 (1.29)	4.01 (.001)	2.22 (.979)	2.65 (1.10)

\* In parentheses shown standard deviation.



**Figure 4:** Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for execution methods

For fire weapons as execution methods perceptions varied by gender  $t(1,483) = .142, p = .707$ ; by age  $F(3,482) = 31.60, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 11.02, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 11.95, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 9.87, p = .002$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary education, and single persons reported higher mean perception of fire weapons as execution methods compared to men, the employed, the elderly, respondents with university degree, and married persons (Table 6).

For explosive as execution methods perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = .491, p = .027$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 74.77, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 8.09, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 22.33, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 36.86, p = .000$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary education, and single persons reported higher mean perception of explosive as execution methods compared to men, the employed, the elderly, respondents with university degree, and married persons (Table 6).

For chemical weapons as execution methods, perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 142.3, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 63.11, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 3.04, p = .034$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 12.79, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 55.63, p = .000$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with higher education, and single persons reported higher mean perception of chemical weapons as execution methods compared to men, employed persons, middle aged people, respondents with secondary education, and married persons (Table 6).

For biological weapons as execution methods perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 152.6, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 61.18, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 8.03, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 11.49, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 47.11, p = .002$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with higher education, and single persons reported higher mean perception of biological weapons as execution methods compared to men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents with secondary education, and married persons (Table 6).

For nuclear weapons as execution methods perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 81.88, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 70.37, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 5.41, p = .002$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 9.76, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 53.66, p = .000$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary education, and single persons reported higher mean perception of nuclear weapons as execution methods compared to men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents with university degree, and those in relationship (Table 6).

For radiological weapons as execution methods perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 108.69, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 76.16, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 7.65, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 15.56, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 74.93, p = .000$ . It was found that women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with university degree, and single persons reported higher mean perception of radiological weapons as execution methods compared to men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents with secondary education, and those in relationship (Table 6).

**Table 6:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of potential execution methods

	Gender		Age			Education level			Marital status			Employment status	
	Men	Women	Younger	Middle aged	Elderly	Secondary	High	University	Single	In relationship	Married	Employed	Unemployed
<b>Fire weapons</b>	2.96 (.977)	3.01 (1.08)	3.22 (1.11)	2.69 (.719)	2.47 (.824)	2.96 (1.02)	2.37 (1.21)	3.07 (.963)	2.99 (1.04)	3.24 (1.11)	4.01 (1.00)	2.79 (.881)	3.10 (1.11)
<b>Explosive</b>	3.33 (.849)	3.53 (1.02)	3.74 (.990)	3.19 (.436)	2.66 (.809)	3.26 (.932)	3.71 (1.13)	3.69 (.907)	3.60 (.959)	3.72 (.994)	4.01 (.000)	3.12 (.766)	3.64 (1.00)
<b>Chemical weapons</b>	2.03 (.997)	3.21 (1.12)	3.11 (1.18)	1.94 (1.15)	2.29 (.689)	2.61 (1.12)	3.00 (1.27)	2.89 (1.32)	2.85 (1.06)	3.04 (1.32)	2.01 (.000)	2.22 (1.02)	3.03 (1.23)
<b>Biological weapons</b>	1.95 (1.02)	3.18 (1.11)	3.05 (1.22)	1.91 (1.11)	2.24 (.709)	2.50 (1.14)	3.18 (1.18)	2.89 (1.31)	2.80 (1.09)	2.97 (1.32)	2.02 (.000)	2.20 (1.02)	2.95 (1.26)
<b>Nuclear weapons</b>	1.64 (.978)	2.70 (1.43)	2.69 (1.38)	1.63 (1.06)	1.42 (.821)	2.07 (1.22)	2.45 (1.53)	2.57 (1.49)	2.30 (1.29)	2.64 (1.41)	2.05 (.000)	1.71 (1.10)	2.59 (1.40)
<b>Radiological weapons</b>	1.69 (.911)	2.84 (1.36)	2.80 (1.32)	1.78 (1.03)	1.45 (.823)	2.13 (1.23)	2.50 (1.50)	2.73 (1.34)	2.62 (1.28)	2.75 (1.27)	2.04 (.002)	1.74 (1.04)	2.74 (1.33)

\* In parentheses shown standard deviation.

In Figure 5 authors summarizes percentage of respondents and related Likert scale values given for perceptions of potential places of the terrorist attack. In relation to the obtained mean values, the likelihood of an attack is the highest in a public place ( $M = 3.68$ ), then in public buildings ( $M = 3.49$ ), than on state authorities ( $M = 3.33$ ), than on a plane ( $M = 3.31$ ), than on a train ( $M = 2.78$ ), and finally at a health care institutions ( $M = 2.66$ ). Thus, the majority of respondents point out (61.8%) that terrorist groups could attack in a public place, and the smallest number of respondents point out (25.1%) health care institutions.


Public building perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 7.37, p = .007$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 41.04, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 5.93, p = .001$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 82.07, p = .000$ , but did not vary by education level  $F(3,481) = 1.82, p = .059$ . It was found that women, single persons, the unemployed, and younger persons reported higher mean public building perceptions as potential place of the

terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, the employed, and the elderly (Table 7).

Public place perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 11.59, p = .001$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 82.55, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 5.89, p = .001$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 13.04, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 124.9, p = .000$ . It was found that women, single persons, the unemployed, and younger people reported higher mean public place perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, the employed, and the elderly (Table 7).

Plane perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 28.51, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 56.93, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 14.05, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 19.83, p = .000$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 54.27, p = .000$ . It was found that women, single persons, the unemployed, respondents with university education, and younger people





**Figure 5:** Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for potential place of the terrorist attack

reported higher mean plane perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, employed people, respondents with secondary education, and the elderly (Table 7).

Bus perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 5.63, p = .018$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 15.38, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 11.43, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 1.30, p = .271$ ; and the employment status  $F(1,483) = 24.83, p = .000$ . It was found that women, married persons, the unemployed, respondents with university education, and younger persons reported higher mean bus perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to men, single persons, employed people, respondents with secondary education, and the elderly (Table 7).

Train perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = .000, p = .984$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 23.33, p = .000$ ; by education level  $F(3,481) = 8.46, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = .860, p = .462$ ; and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 20.41, p = .000$ . It was found that men, married persons, the unemployed, respondents with university education, and younger persons reported higher mean train perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to women, single persons, employed persons, respondents with secondary education, and the elderly (Table 7).

Public authorities perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 37.42, p = .000$ ; by age  $F(2,482) = 17.57, p = .000$ ; by marital status  $F(3,481) = 11.58, p = .000$ , but do not vary by education level  $F(3,481) = 1.56, p = .202$  or by employment status  $F(1,483) = 1.39, p = .238$ . It was found that women, single persons, and younger people reported higher mean public au-

thorities' perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, and the elderly (Table 7).

Health care institutions perceptions varied by gender  $F(1,483) = 42.45, p = .000$  and by age  $F(2,482) = 24.16, p = .000$ , but did not vary by education level  $F(3,481) = 1.10, p = .349$ , by marital status  $F(3,481) = 1.89, p = .129$  and by employment status  $F(1,483) = 1.70, p = .057$ . It was found that women, younger persons, and single people reported higher mean health care institutions perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack compared to men, the elderly, and married persons. (Table 7).

**Table 7:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of potential terrorist attacks

	Gender		Age			Education level			Marital status			Employment status	
	Men	Women	Younger	Middle aged	Elderly	Secondary	High	University	Single	In relationship	Married	Employed	Unemployed
<b>Public building</b>	3.23 (.974)	3.60 (1.20)	3.85 (.975)	2.96 (.864)	2.82 (1.36)	3.32 (1.18)	3.45 (.504)	3.63 (1.15)	3.62 (1.02)	3.61 (1.13)	3.18 (1.18)	2.92 (1.13)	3.83 (.959)
<b>Public place</b>	3.48 (1.02)	3.83 (1.22)	4.14 (.908)	3.06 (.936)	2.79 (1.36)	3.55 (1.22)	4.11 (.894)	3.78 (1.10)	3.96 (.978)	3.82 (1.18)	3.22 (1.20)	2.98 (1.19)	4.12 (.892)
<b>Plane</b>	3.01 (.998)	3.53 (1.14)	3.69 (1.06)	2.80 (.758)	2.55 (1.07)	3.06 (1.17)	3.71 (.867)	3.66 (.932)	3.36 (1.05)	3.60 (1.05)	2.87 (1.08)	2.85 (1.12)	3.59 (1.01)
<b>Bus</b>	2.73 (.971)	2.97 (1.17)	3.12 (1.09)	2.57 (.899)	2.32 (1.08)	2.69 (1.11)	3.42 (.826)	3.01 (1.11)	2.76 (1.12)	3.01 (1.04)	2.86 (1.14)	2.55 (1.13)	3.07 (1.02)
<b>Train</b>	2.87 (.905)	2.86 (1.19)	3.06 (1.04)	2.72 (.759)	2.34 (1.37)	2.72 (1.21)	2.95 (.226)	3.07 (.954)	2.88 (1.01)	2.96 (1.07)	2.76 (1.18)	2.59 (1.10)	3.07 (1.02)
<b>Public authorities</b>	2.96 (1.21)	3.59 (1.01)	3.47 (1.09)	2.78 (1.33)	3.55 (.681)	3.26 (1.13)	3.29 (.565)	3.43 (1.25)	2.62 (1.26)	2.56 (1.24)	2.97 (1.01)	3.25 (1.13)	3.38 (1.13)
<b>Health care institutions</b>	2.26 (1.05)	2.94 (1.18)	2.88 (1.17)	2.01 (.886)	2.74 (1.25)	2.61 (1.17)	2.84 (.495)	2.69 (1.32)	2.69 (1.29)	2.78 (1.09)	2.49 (1.15)	2.50 (1.11)	2.76 (1.21)

\* In parentheses shown standard deviation.

## 6 Discussion

According to the official Government of Serbia report “National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism” for the Period 2016–2021, terrorism constitutes a clear and present danger to the national security of the country, its diplomats in other countries and to individual citizen safety. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Balkan region. The modern history of Serbia has been marked by numerous acts of terrorism, starting with the assassination of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand in 1914 – an event that precipitated the global catastrophe of World War I. Violent acts to achieve political, religious and ethnic objectives have continued to occur on a regular basis, regardless of border changes and forms

of government through periods of rule by monarchy, the long period of communism, the years of civil conflict following the disintegration of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, up to the present time. Perhaps the threat of violent acts perpetrated in Serbia has never been greater than it is today due to the increasingly delicate security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, radicalization of Islamic youth in the Balkans resulting from the effective use of social media by extremist groups, and the return of ISIS fighters to their homes in the region following the destruction of their Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. All of these events represent a potential tinderbox that can explode into terrorism directed against the Republic of Serbia and its citizens. The effective addressing of these potential threats obviously should be directed to eliminating the root causes of terrorism, but at the

same time government agencies – national and local alike – and individual citizens should be aware of this growing threat. Various forms of violent acts (e.g., improvised explosive devices, chemical or biological terrorism) are possible. There are a range of citizen safety actions that can be taken by the population to minimize morbidity and mortality in the case of a terrorist attack.

The study described in this paper addresses critical initial steps in the counter-terrorism planning process, namely determining the state of perception of citizens in Serbia regarding terrorism and the current state of individual, household and government preparedness and security in the event of such violent acts. Documenting the degree of knowledge that individual citizens have regarding the types of weapons most likely to be used against them by terrorists, potential health consequences of these weapons, most likely areas and parts of municipal infrastructure that terrorists would target and last but not least, what sort of optimal measures citizens can take to maximize their probability of survival.

Public health planners and emergency management agencies will benefit greatly from the results of our study. Our results will assist in identifying demographic and socio-economic differences vis-à-vis a community's perception of overall risk of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, knowledge of a community's perception of terrorist attack risk will assist appropriate emergency management agencies in developing public health messages, programs, and distribution channels tailor-made for a given community based on evidence-based decision making. Emergency management agencies should account for these differences in terrorism risk perception between different communities and state jurisdictions in the crafting of more useful counter-terrorism strategies and plans based on behavioral change promotion and risk management decision-making.

The recently published report "National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism" concludes that the trend of terrorism is not only a clear and present danger to both national security and safety of the citizens of Serbia, but the probability of deadly attacks with the potential for thousands of casualties (mostly citizens) will only increase in the next 5-10 years due to a variety of factors, including increased tensions in the Kosovo and Metohija area, increased radicalization of home-grown terrorism, as well as infiltration of violent and battle-hardened ISIS fighters into the country. In addition, the specter of partnerships between cross-border organized crime elements in the drug and human-trafficking business and Islamic terrorists intent on committing acts of violence enhances the prospects for serious trouble ahead. However, contrary to the findings of this official government

report, the results of our survey of citizens in Belgrade suggest that almost 60% of the study respondents believe that a terrorist attack does not present an imminent threat to public safety or national security – that is, within the next 12 months. Strengthening our contention (based on results from our limited study sample of residents living in Belgrade) that our view apparently is shared by the Chief of the Department for Combating Terrorism of the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Interior who reports that the possibility for a terrorist attack is low at the moment, but he expresses concerns for the years to come due to evidence of increased "self-radicalization" among young people in predominantly Muslim communities and neighborhoods.

The latter point of concern is supported by our study, which shows that respondents tend to believe that the probability of a terrorist attack will increase within the next 5-10 years. Furthermore, our study results also indicate a majority of respondents (55.6%) believe that the local community is unprepared to respond to a terrorist event, and that 45.1% fear that individual citizens are unprepared. The results of our study are consistent with findings from past studies of public risk perception of terrorism threats. Results of studies in Tokyo (Byers, 2014) following the sarin chemical weapon attack on the city's subway system in 1995 and following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001 (Simon & Teperman, 2001) also revealed the following: (1) that the communities affected by these two catastrophic terrorist events perceived that the probability of a terrorist attack will increase within the next 5-10 years; (2) that most study respondents believed that the local community continued to be unprepared to respond to a terrorist event; and (3) that individual citizens remained unprepared despite just having recently experienced major terrorist attacks with large loss of life.

There are very few studies in the literature on the topic of community risk perception regarding a "real" future terrorist attacks targeting that community. Our results, however, are consistent with research findings conducted in several locations in Romania (Stănescu et al., 2016). The Romanian studies indicated that even though Romanian authorities faced relatively strong and real threats of terrorist attacks during the period of these studies (i.e., terrorism threats were near the top of the list of potential disasters according to official Government of Romania National security strategy documents), the threat of terrorism was ranked near the bottom of potential disaster threats by local community civil defense and emergency management officials. Also, the results of our study are consistent with research findings in Canada (Lemyre et al., 2006) regarding demographic differences in perceptions of terrorism and gender representing an important determinant. Our findings showed that a statistically sig-

nificant percentage of male respondents believe that there is a low probability of a terrorist attack in the near future. These findings are consistent with past studies of public risk perception of terrorism threats (Lemyre et al., 2006) where citizens do not consider terrorism to be a large threat to the Canadian public, nor do they perceive it as a great threat to themselves. This belief goes in the face of direct evidence that the Republic of Serbia is a major hub on the most widely used illicit transit routes to Western Europe, both for home-grown radicalized individuals from Muslim communities in the Balkans and ISIS fighters fleeing from their defeats in the Middle East and Africa. Other worrisome findings of our study have shown that the statistically significant majority of respondents would give community emergency management organizations low marks for their overall preparedness efforts and the degree of effectiveness of such planning process efforts.

## 7 Conclusion

Results of our survey indicate that there are major differences in the public's perception of risks presented by terrorism threats in Belgrade. We encourage emergency management agencies in Serbia to use their knowledge of these differences in public perception of risks identified in our study to develop enhanced counter-terrorism preparedness measures through the promotion of behavioural change, an adjustment of thought which goes with the adoption of improved risk management decision-making procedures. For example, the general public needs to be trained in initial care of victims in the same way Basic Life Support is currently taught. Furthermore, to improve risk management decision-making we need to anticipate virtually all possible scenarios because terrorism is now a clear and present danger to the safety of citizens of Serbia. All cities and towns in Serbia need to have up-to-date disaster plans that are tailored to specific scenarios and locations as opposed to only preconceived generalized plans. Airport plane crashes, stadium catastrophes, and remote mass transit accidents are all vastly different routes to terrorist attacks and require different responses. Communications need to be standardized and backed up. Triage needs to be thought out more clearly. Scene control to prevent access from unauthorized medical personnel is likewise important. The problems of a building collapse caused by blast devices need to be addressed by engineers and EMS planners.

Limitations of our study include: 1) potential bias in selecting study subjects to complete questionnaires; 2) no study participants had any experience with a "real life" terrorist event; and 3) the study used primarily quantitative research methods and could have benefited from a more qualitative analytic approach. Future research would benefit from a more

epidemiologic approach (e.g. case-control and cohort studies) to determine risk factors for poor community responses to a given terrorist event, "before and after" studies looking at a population in Serbia that has been affected by a human-generated disasters such as terrorism, and studies using currently validated modelling and simulation methods.

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## **Vidiki ogrožanja javnosti s terorizmom v Beogradu: pomen za upravljanje tveganj za posameznike, skupnosti in javne organe**

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Glede na dolgoletno zgodovino terorističnih groženj v Srbiji je cilj prispevka opredeliti stopnjo pripravljenosti posameznikov, lokalnih skupnosti in občinskih institucij na zaznavanje tveganj za teroristične napade v Beogradu, prestolnici Republike Srbije. Uporabljen je bil strukturirani vprašalnik o zaznavi tveganj terorističnih napadov in pripravljenosti na njih. Vprašalnik je obsegal vprašanja zaprtega tipa z več možnimi odgovori in vprašanja, ki so bila merjena na petstopenjski Likertovi lestvici. Anketiranje je potekalo med junijem in septembrom 2017 v obliki telefonske ankete z uporabo naključnih števil klicanja. V študiji je sodelovalo 485 odraslih prebivalcev, ki so se strinjali s sodelovanjem v študiji. Odgovori anketirancev so opozorili na nizko verjetnost za teroristični napad, v primerjavi z verjetnostjo terorističnih napadov v njihovi skupnosti in omejeno znanje o protiterorističnih dejavnostih, ki jih trenutno izvajajo javni organi. Nadalje so ugotovitve pokazale statistično pomembne razlike v zaznavi terorističnih groženj v Beogradu glede na demografske značilnosti, kot so starost, spol, zaposlitev in pretekle izkušnje z večjimi izrednimi dogodki. Agencije kriznega upravljanja v Srbiji bi morale uporabiti ugotovitve te študije pri razvoju ukrepov pripravljenosti zoper terorizem, ki bi temeljili na spodbujanju sprememb v vedenju – sprejetje učinkovitejših postopkov odločanja v kriznem upravljanju. Za izboljšanje odločanja v kriznem upravljanju je treba predvideti skoraj vse možne scenarije, saj predstavlja terorizem nevarnost za državljane Srbije. Vsa srbska mesta bi morala posedovati posodobljene načrte za upravljanje v kriznih situacijah, ki bi bili prilagojeni glede na specifične scenarije in lokacije, v nasprotju s trenutno veljavnimi predhodnimi splošnimi načrti.

**Ključne besede:** terorizem, zaznava tveganja, grožnja, pripravljenost, sprejemanje odločitev, Beograd

**UDK:** 343.3(497.11)